Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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C13: Public Goods, Cohesion Policy, and Procurement Location: Room 114 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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The Effect of Yardstick Competition on Public Goods Supply under Vertical Political Externality Doshisha University, Japan In this study, we examine the effect of yardstick competition on the level of public good provision under shared accountability, which is the co-financing of public goods by upper and lower governments. It is well known that partial expenditure decentralization, where different levels of government share costs, leads to the under-provision of public goods (Joanis (2014). This occurs because rent-maximizing politicians have a free-riding incentive (vertical political externality) to place the cost burden on the other level of government. We investigate whether the introduction of yardstick competition can mitigate this under-provision. Our analysis yields three key findings. First, yardstick competition alleviates the under-provision of public goods. Second, this positive effect is decreased by the distortion caused by the asymmetric vertical political externality. Third, when asymmetric vertical political externality exists and yardstick competition is sufficiently prevalent, the efficacy of yardstick competition is limited and suppressing vertical political externality is more effective.
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