Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:42am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F05: Preferences for Redistribution, Wealth Taxes, and Climate Finance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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How to Finance Climate Change Policies? Evidence from Consumers’ Beliefs 1: ifo Institute Munich, Germany; 2: Georgetown University; 3: University of Chicago Economists design schemes to finance environmental policies based on efficiency, but voters, whose support determines the feasibility of such schemes, hold beliefs about efficiency and fairness that often collide with economic theory. We design a large-scale information experiment to assess a representative population’s beliefs about alternative financing schemes. Informed consumers support a CO2 tax after learning the rich pollute more, but oppose it and do not oppose government deficits when learning older people also pollute more. When learning that certain groups, due to luck, gain from climate change, consumers oppose redistribution from gainers to losers. Everybody despises market solutions such as private insurance. Consumers’ beliefs could lead to inefficient schemes to finance environmental policies but communication can manage consumers’ beliefs about the desirability of alternative schemes.
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