Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:41am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F02: Small Firms, Informality, and Simplified Tax Regimes Location: Room 102 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Income Shifting versus Real Responses in Simplified Tax Regimes 1: Paris School of Economics, France; 2: Nova School of Business; 3: World Bank; 4: Receita Federal de Brasil Simplified tax regimes exist in almost every country and most often rely on revenue taxation, which lowers the registration cost but distorts input demand, such as labor. We exploit a policy introduced in 2018 called "Factor R" that created a massive tax notch based on the payroll-to-revenue ratio. If a firm has a payroll-to-revenue ratio above 28%, the revenue tax rate drops from 16% to 6%, shifting the whole Factor R distribution. Moreover, this policy created two clean quasi-experiments. Firm owners below 28% pre-policy have strong incentives to increase their Factor R, which they do entirely by shifting dividends to wages rather than increasing employment. Firm owners above 28% pre-policy become automatically eligible for the tax cut, show no increase in employment, but a large revenue elasticity, which is most likely explained by a reduction in underreporting.
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