Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:06:42am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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A05: Corporate Transparency and Tax Compliance Location: Room 105 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Anticipatory effects of corporate tax shaming: Evidence from the European Union 1: Yale University; 2: Institute for Fiscal Studies; 3: University of Amsterdam The effectiveness of public shaming in motivating tax compliance is well documented for individuals, but less so for corporations. We analyze anticipatory effects of the EU's Directive on Public Country-by-Country Reporting (PCbCR) and its interaction with the Global Minimum Tax. PCbCR requires large multinational corporations to publicly disclose financial data from 2026; the latter imposes a "top-up" tax on undertaxed profits, which may itself become public. Listed firms with higher ex-ante exposure to public shaming (media, ESG) and voluntary disclosure activity recorded increases in their effective tax rates of 5-7 percentage points (pp) after the announcement of the reforms in 2021. In contrast, we find that banks, which are exempt from the Directive, recorded decreases in their tax rates of more than 6 pp. We point to changes in the media spotlight and NGO scrutiny to explain, in part, the heterogeneity in responses across industries.
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