Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:39:40am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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F07: Corporate Tax Reform and Multinational Investment Location: Room 107 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Tax Policy and IP-Based Profit Shifting: Evidence from the TCJA on Patent Relocation by U.S. Multinationals WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany This paper examines how the 2017 U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act affected the international allocation of patents by U.S. multinationals. Using firm-country-year data from Orbis Intellectual Property, it provides the first systematic firm-level evidence on post-TCJA patent relocation. Cross-border patent offshoring falls by roughly 45 percent, and by about 60 percent for intra-company transfers, the margin at which tax-motivated relocation operates most directly. There is no corresponding increase in acquisitions: net repatriation appears only in a handful of very large restructurings. A within-firm design absorbing all firm-year and destination-year shocks finds no differential response by partner-country tax status, consistent with GILTI's global blending. Two measurement results are of independent interest: Orbis coverage of unconsolidated financials is sharply asymmetric between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, and defining panel dyads on full-sample rather than pre-reform activity generates spurious effects. The reform deterred new offshoring without inducing firms to unwind existing positions.
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