Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.
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Some information on the session logistics:
If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair. (Exception: invited sessions)
Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.
Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/en/event/iipf/ .
Venue address: ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics & Management, R. Francesinhas 21, 1200-675 Lisboa, Portugal
Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 17th Sept 2026, 11:37:39am WEST
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Daily Overview |
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D14: Elections, Political Connections, and Offshore Finance Location: Room 116 (Francesinhas 1) | |
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Do Firms Hire Politicians as Directors? Evidence from Close Elections 1: University of Lucerne, Switzerland; 2: University of Fribourg, Switzerland; 3: University of St. Gallen, Switzerland In many countries, elected politicians are overrepresented on corporate boards. This raises concerns about firms gaining political access and has led several countries to ban board membership for office-holders. We test this troubling access-seeking hypothesis against a benign selection hypothesis. Because only the access-seeking hypothesis implies a causal effect of winning elections on board membership, we employ a close-election regression discontinuity design with data on Swiss federal legislators from 1931–2015. We find a substantial overrepresentation of politicians on boards, but at most a small causal effect. Thus, the overrepresentation mostly reflects positive selection, not firms’ pursuit of political access.
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