Mobile money is a key digital alternative to traditional banking in developing countries, yet several African governments have introduced taxes on its transactions. Using a stylized model, cross-country panel survey data, and transaction-level data, we show that such taxes reduce user numbers, transaction frequency, and transaction value, with high tax elasticity. Evidence from Cameroon and Central Africa Republic indicates a significant drop in usage probability and in transaction volume. Unbanked and rural users respond less, suggesting they bear a disproportionate tax burden.

Cryptocurrencies pose substantial challenges to tax enforcement due to their anonymous and decentralized properties, undermining conventional regulatory practices. We study the impact of an ambitious new enforcement initiative aimed at addressing these challenges: domestic third-party reporting of crypto income. We estimate tax compliance and behavioral responses to this new policy by combining unique Danish microdata from domestic crypto platforms, administrative tax records, and cross-border bank transfers. Despite the introduction of domestic third-party reporting, over 90% of crypto investors do not declare crypto income. Moreover, we identify a significant and persistent evasion response to the policy as investors shift trading activity from domestic platforms, subject to third-party reporting, to foreign platforms outside regulatory reach. Our findings underscore the limits of domestic enforcement strategies in addressing tax evasion for decentralized, borderless assets like cryptocurrencies, highlighting the need for international coordination.

The digitalization of tax payments is a key policy focus in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in Africa. This study examines its impact on compliance, leveraging Eswatini’s 2021 zero-cash-handling mandate. Using administrative tax data, we assess (i) the effects of voluntary digital payment adoption and (ii) the mandate’s impact. A staggered difference-in-differences (DiD) approach shows that voluntary adoption reduces late payments by 19 percentage points (25%) and improves payment accuracy by 5.7 percentage points (22%)—rising to 9 percentage points (30%) for strictly digital methods—while having minimal effect on total tax paid. A treatment-intensity DiD strategy finds that the mandate eliminated cash payments but had modest compliance effects, increasing tax payments by 3.5% for individuals and 1.6% for corporations, with no improvement in accuracy. These findings highlight differences between voluntary and mandated adoption, emphasizing the need for policies that account for taxpayer heterogeneity to enhance compliance.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the adoption of mobile money has increased substantially during the last decade and is an important driver of financial inclusion in the region. At the same time, governments have implemented tax on mobile money transfers that may constrain financial inclusion and provide an incentive for cash transfers. The introduction of the taxes has led to heated public debate and reductions in the mobile money tax rates in several countries, making the tax highly salient to many taxpayers. This paper examines the effect of tax salience on the use of mobile money. Using a lab experiment among market traders in Dar es Salaam, we find that increasing the salience of the tax significantly reduces the use of mobile money.