Conference Agenda

This paper estimates the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of Germany’s 2000 introduction of conditional birthright citizenship on juvenile crime in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. We utilize administrative police data on suspects involved in multiple incidents and/or serious offenses and, employing a difference-in-differences approach, find that the policy (i) decreased the number of incidents for suspects born between the first six months after the enactment of the reform by approximately 9%, (ii) led to a larger (-11% vs. -7%) and more significant decrease of incidents in regions with high vs. low treatment intensity, (iii) is associated with a crime decrease for boys (-11%), but with an increase for girls (+9%), and (iv) has reduced the number of incidents (intensive margin) linked to suspects, but not the number of suspects involved in multiple incidents and/or serious offenses (extensive margin).

This paper studies firms violating labor regulations and the impact of enforcement on firms and workers. We leverage inspection records linked to survey and administrative employer-employee data for large Mexican manufacturing firms. Violating firms appear to train less, outsource more, and hold a greater labor market share. Inspections tend to increase compliance by prompting worker training, reducing workplace accidents, and lowering future violations. Using a staggered difference-in-differences approach, we causally estimate that conditionally random inspections raise employment by about 4% within a year. These effects are unlikely driven by informal worker formalization. Instead, our findings align with a model where monopsonistic firms use their market power to set wages and working conditions. Improved conditions raise labor supply, as workers value them, supported by survey evidence. Enforcing labor regulation compliance among large manufacturing firms can be an effective policy tool to improve working conditions, mitigate labor market power, and increase employment.

Should criminal fines be income-dependent? We explore this question in the context of the Finnish speeding fine system, which exhibits income-dependence. Building on the optimal commodity tax literature, we construct a model of optimal fine determination in which the planner uses fines and income taxes to mitigate speeding externalities and redistribute resources across individuals. At the optimum, fines will be income dependent if either (1) the marginal social cost of speeding is correlated with the income of the offender (the efficiency motive) or (2) preferences for crime are correlated with income (the redistributive motive); fine elasticities govern the relative importance of these two forces. To estimate these forces empirically, we draw on linked income tax returns, accident reports, and crime report data from Finland. However, statutory motivations for income-dependent fines typically cite “equality-before-the-law,” rather than redistributive or efficiency-based rationales; we therefore plan to measure fairness preferences using a survey.