Empirical evidence suggests that social acceptance of redistribution depends on whether income differences result from individual responsibilities, such as preferences, or from circumstances. Acceptance is limited when differences stem from preferences, but greater when they result from circumstances. We propose a method based on compensating variation (CV) that accounts for this distinction in order to assess the distributional effects of a tax reform. Based on a structural discrete choice labor supply model, we apply our method to evaluate a Norwegian tax reform (2013–2019). We find that the estimated measure of CV when preference heterogeneity is neutralized displays distributional effects that are very similar to those observed with the measure of CV with heterogeneous individual preferences, themselves being very similar to those observed with the well-known CE criterion. Heterogeneity in preferences seems to matter only - and only slightly so - for couples at the low and high ends of the income distribution.

Nordic countries have been exceptional in their ability to combine equality and strong social protection with high taxes and dynamic economies. This paper studies the long-term evolution of Nordic tax-bene t policies and the Nordic model. We include the behavioral employment effects of tax-bene t changes by estimating participation elasticities. There has been a tendency to aim at efficiency over equality in the labor market. The employment effects of lower taxes and benefits do not o -set the increased inequality. The results show weakening social protection in Nordic countries.

Adam Smith considered a tax on income to be an ideal form of raising revenue that was administratively impossible. What changed? I study the intellectual history of the income concept and suggest hypotheses for when and why income became an administratively feasible tax base that was legible to the taxing state. I suggest a role for the rise of new accounting technology and the rise of wage earners---both connected the rise of the firm.

Taxation based on identity has a long, sordid history, and persists to this day, usually in implicit ways. It is a relatively tame cousin of the blatant, violent, and genocidal policies that have targeted people of certain religions, races, and genders for millennia. Tax based on identity is difficult, although not impossible, to justify within standard optimal tax analysis, because in that framework the policy objective is usually framed as being anonymous (impartial) and eschews basing policy on disparate preferences. The most promising justification seems to be if, for example, race is systematically correlated with the failure of income to represent ability to pay. It then acts as a tag that can help achieve the desired allocation of tax burden at minimal efficiency cost. For unjustified identity-based tax policy, analysis can help to spot its existence and quantify its welfare cost.