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Session Overview
Session
D09: Intermunicipal Cooperation and Finance
Time:
Thursday, 21/Aug/2025:
4:30pm - 6:30pm

Session Chair: Agnieszka Kopańska, University of Warsaw
Discussant 1: Alessandro Sovera, Tampere University
Discussant 2: Manish Gupta, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy
Discussant 3: Agnieszka Kopańska, University of Warsaw
Discussant 4: Albert Solé-Ollé, U. of Barcelona

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Presentations

‘Not Without My Friends’: Partisanship and Intermunicipal Cooperation

Albert Solé-Ollé1, Jaume Magre2, Toni Rodón3

1U. of Barcelona, Spain; 2New York U., US; 3U. Pompeu Fabra, Spain

Voluntary cooperation helps address inefficiencies caused by fragmented local governments without politically contentious mergers. However, it is vulnerable to conflict between politicians from different parties. To study the effect of partisan differences on cooperation, we analyze data from Spanish municipal associations and a new administrative database spanning four decades. We conduct three analyses: first, examining whether founder municipalities are more similar in partisanship and other factors; second, studying the impact of transitioning from unaligned to aligned on joining an association; and third, using Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) for causal verification. Our findings show that founders are more alike in partisanship, and the likelihood of joining an association increases by 40% after alignment changes. RDD confirms these results. Additional analyses suggest that the mechanisms behind these findings are linked to shared preferences and higher trust levels.

Solé-Ollé-‘Not Without My Friends’-158.pdf


When Integration Backfires: Examining The Effects Of Inter-Municipal Cooperation On Local Housing Markets

Alessandro Sovera

Tampere University, Finland

This study explores whether the advantages of larger local governments outweigh the inefficiencies associated with consolidation. Specifically, it examines an Italian policy reform that required small municipalities to engage in inter-municipal cooperation for the provision of shared services. The analysis assesses the impact of this reform on local real estate prices, revealing a significant decline in house prices in the affected municipalities. This decrease suggests a deterioration in the quality of public goods provision. Furthermore, we find no evidence supporting alternative explanations, such as changes in taxation or housing supply, for these price fluctuations. Ultimately, the results indicate that the joint management of municipal functions may be harmful to both local governments and their residents, raising critical questions about the overall effectiveness of consolidation efforts.

Sovera-When Integration Backfires-203.pdf


Analysis Of Public Sector Borrowing Requirements Of Select Indian States: Issues And Challenges

Manish Gupta1, Sk Md Azharuddin2, Malvika Mahesh3

1National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, India; 2National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, India; 3National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, India

The paper estimates public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) for select Indian states. In doing so it quantifies their off-budget borrowings and examines guarantees given by them as per their fiscal responsibility legislations. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of its kind for India and covers period from 2015-22. Seven states were selected based on their fiscal performance. It highlights the challenges in deriving estimates of components of PSBR. The study stresses on fiscal transparency which is critical to good governance and policy making and is of the view that instead of focusing on narrow definition of fiscal indicators like debt/ deficit, a broader definition encompassing activities of public sector would make fiscal policy realist and effective. It examines factors that influence PSBR for Indian states and finds it to be positively related to per capita GSDP and fiscal-deficit-to-GSDP ratio and inversely to states’ own-tax-revenue-to-total-expenditure ratio.

Gupta-Analysis Of Public Sector Borrowing Requirements Of Select Indian States-365.pdf


How Treasurers Reputation influence Local Government Finance?

Agnieszka Kopańska

University of Warsaw, Poland

The study investigates how the reputation of a treasurer—based on their tenure compared to that of the mayor—affects financial outcomes in Polish local governments. It employs the Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) method to analyze two groups of local governments: those where the treasurer was appointed by the incumbent mayor and those where the treasurer has held the position longer than the current mayor. The findings indicate that treasurers with a strong reputation lead to better financial results for local governments. This includes lower expenses, higher tax revenues, and reduced deficits and debt. Conversely, local governments with treasurers who have a weaker reputation tend to have higher current expenditures, lower investment expenditures, and increased debt issuance

Kopańska-How Treasurers Reputation influence Local Government Finance-376.pdf