The Condorcet paradox has been a significant focus of investigation since Kenneth Arrow rediscovered its importance for economic theory. Recent research on this phenomenon has oscillated between simulation studies, probability calculations based on hypothetical voter preferences, and empirical analyses often limited by unsatisfactory data. This paper presents the first comprehensive evaluation of 253 electoral polls conducted across 59 countries. Our findings demonstrate that the Condorcet paradox has virtually no empirical relevance: with only one exception, we find no evidence of cyclical majorities in any of the 253 elections. This result remains robust after statistical inference testing. Furthermore, this study provides insights into which parties are particularly likely to emerge as Condorcet winners and explores how these Condorcet winners assert themselves after elections.

How important are search frictions in the market for charitable donations? I study a dynamic search and matching model to produce new insights for our understanding of the charitable sector. First, the model highlights the role that charity characteristics play in equilibrium donations. Second, charity competition takes the form of a congestion externality. This externality can be influenced by policy instruments like the tax treatment of donations. Finally, empirical support for the model in a form of a charitable giving Beveridge curve is presented.

Utilizing instrumental variable (IV) Probit model on a dataset recovered from field survey on 2nd-5th, August, 2024 in Nairobi City, and employing MLE technique, we establish a 'no-profitability' threshold for low-income gamers. We establish that for football betting budget shares above 0.483%, the financial gain motive waxes off for individuals who strongly disagree that tax increment reduces the frequency of betting on competitive football. Most important, we justify the 'no profitability' hypothesis while concluding that the smoking habits of parents affect negatively, though not significantly, the gambling status of offspring. We, therefore, recommend a regressive and punitive tax on bet stakes in order to cushion low-income gamers against 'self-control'-induced

bankruptcy arising from unprofitable betting.

We conduct a randomized experiment comparing individual- and team-based performance pay among credit officers at a microfinance institution in Uganda. We find that tying rewards to individual or team performance has no significant effect on job performance (loan outcomes). However, turnover is substantially higher under individual incentives, with twice as many employees leaving compared to the team-based scheme. Survey data also reveals lower job and workplace satisfaction under individual incentives. Importantly, when individual incentives are combined with a portfolio rotation policy — which more equitably distributes opportunities for bonuses — the negative effect on turnover is mitigated. These results highlight the risks of individual incentive pay, which can reduce satisfaction and increase turnover. Introducing complementary policies like portfolio rotation can help address these unintended consequences and support better retention under individual-based incentive systems.