Traditional tax audits are effective at raising revenue but are costly to scale. Can third-party auditors enhance compliance, or are they prone to collusion due to inherent conflicts of interest? We study a policy reform in India that introduced unanticipated changes in the revenue threshold for mandatory third-party audits. Using a combination of bunching and difference-in-differences methods on administrative data, we estimate that third-party audits can increase tax payments by around 45\%, on average. However, firms with income or expenses already subject to third-party reporting exhibit smaller responses to private audits, reflecting a lower scope for manipulation. Our findings suggest that extending third-party audit requirements to smaller firms below the current threshold may be a cost-effective approach to increasing compliance in low state capacity settings.

The compliance effect of tax agents in low-income countries has received little attention in the literature. This study asses their impact through matching analysis of the universe of CIT and VAT returns submitted in Uganda between 2019 and 2023. Tax agents’ impact, proxied by the presence of audit expenses, is confirmed as broadly positive. CIT returns prepared by agents show no difference in declared liabilities in the aggregate, and higher declared CIT liabilities in the case of small and medium taxpayers. Significant but small increases in total VAT declared are mediated by increases in reported input and output VAT. Taxpayers relying on agents’ services are also less likely to nil-file and more likely to file late, while a higher likelihood of audit selection does not lead to significant differences in audit adjustments. These results are robust to different specifications and an alternative definition of agents’ use based on survey data.

I estimate the effects of tax audits on firm direct and indirect tax evasion as well as non-compliance in Pakistan using the universe of tax returns filed by registered firms between TY2008-TY2021. I leverage 7 years of natural experiments, during which time Pakistan varied audit eligibility policies between full eligibility, in which all firms are eligible; parametric eligibility, in which only evasive firms are targeted and eligible; and risk-based eligibility, in which only non-compliant firms are targeted and eligible. Despite changes in audit eligibility, each policy retained random audit selection conditional on eligibility, which I leverage for identification. This context allows me to estimate the static and dynamic effects of tax audits on different populations of firms (i.e., evasive firms and non-compliant firms) and estimate heterogeneous effects of tax audits based on the size of firms. Additionally, I provide evidence on the effect of simply being eligible for an audit.

Making use of a rich administrative dataset on Ugandan firms’ tax filings covering the period 2013–2021, this paper investigates the impact of tax audits on voluntary compliance, contrasting the effect of one versus multiple audits. Using a matched Difference-in-Differences approach with similar unaudited firms as controls, and a stacked design to address staggered treatment timing, the analysis shows that among firms that consistently file taxes over the study period, audits induce higher value-added tax (VAT) liabilities. Crucially, this is entirely driven by firms receiving multiple audits, underlining the importance of repeated interactions with the tax authority for fostering compliance among this set of taxpayers.