This paper studies whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) respond to international anti-tax

avoidance regulations by increasing local profit shifting activities. Within Germany, local variation of profit tax rates facilitate similar avoidance strategies on a sub-national level through the use of intellectual property or financing structures. We study whether these local schemes serve as complements orsubstitutes for international profit shifting. To explore the use of local profit shifting activities by MNEs, we construct a novel database documenting the network structures of MNEs that link international to sub-national tax havens. We hypothesize that MNEs intensify their domestic tax avoidance practices in response to stricter international regulations. Our findings highlight the adaptive strategies of MNEs in response to evolving international tax policies and underscore the complexity of recent anti-tax avoidance regulations and their consequences at both the international and local level.

We develop a methodology to decompose the tax revenue impact of the global minimum tax introduced in 2024 into several components and quantify its potential impact on profit shifting. We apply it to 34 thousand multinational-country observations from tax returns, financial statements and country-by-country reports of all multinationals active in Slovakia. We find that the global minimum tax has the potential to decrease profit shifting by most multinationals, which are on average likely to pay higher effective tax rates in most countries worldwide post-reform. We find that Slovak corporate tax revenues will increase by 4%, with half of the increase due to its minimum top-up taxes. The other half of the increase is corporate income tax on profits that will no longer be shifted out of the country. We expect the global minimum tax to target 49% of previously shifted profits.

We study the potential impact of the OECD Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) minimum tax on banks, combining a theoretical model with a new cross-country dataset of bank-level tax haven exposure and profitability. We show that the policy affects banks’ effective tax burden, their internal capital markets, and ultimately their financial stability metrics under Basel III. A dynamic stress-testing simulation and a difference-indifferences analysis reveal that banks with significant tax haven profit shares are more sensitive to post-GloBE regulatory shocks.