Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference.

Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.

Some information on the session logistics:

If not stated otherwise, the discussant is the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. The last speaker of each session is the session chair.

Presenters should speak for no more than 20 minutes, and discussants should limit their remarks to no more than 5 minutes. The remaining time should be reserved for audience questions and the presenter’s responses. We suggest following these guidelines also in the (less common) 3-paper sessions in a 2-hour slot, to allow participants to move between sessions. Discussants are encouraged to avoid summarizing the paper. By focusing on a few questions and comments, the discussants can help start a broader discussion with the audience.

Only registered participants can attend this conference. Further information available on the congress website https://www.usiu.ac.ke/iipf/ .

Venue address: United States International University Africa, USIU Road, Off Thika Road (Exit 7, Kenya), P.O. Box 14634, 00800 Nairobi, Kenya

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 9th Oct 2025, 01:18:16am EAT

 
 
Session Overview
Location: SS5
Date: Wednesday, 20/Aug/2025
11:00am - 1:00pmA02: Corporate Income Tax Reforms
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Shafik Hebous, International Monetary Fund IMF
Discussant 1: Lucía Contreras, University of Manchester
Discussant 2: Biniyam Gezahegn Worku, University College Dublin
Discussant 3: Shafik Hebous, International Monetary Fund IMF
Discussant 4: Kristoffer Berg, University of Cambridge
 

Taxing Corporate or Shareholder Income: A Sufficient-Statistics Approach

Kristoffer Berg1,2,3

1Trinity College, University of Cambridge; 2Centre for Business Taxation, University of Oxford; 3Norwegian Fiscal Studies, University of Oslo

As tax competition and profit shifting have put pressure on corporate income tax rates across the world, the role of other capital taxes becomes more important. This paper studies the choice between income taxation at the corporate and shareholder level. I develop a tractable sufficient-statistics framework to determine optimal corporate and shareholder income taxes. The main result is that when the incidence of the corporate income tax on workers is higher than that of shareholder income taxes, lower tax rates on corporate relative to shareholder income are typically optimal. In a policy application, I derive optimal reform directions for corporate and shareholder income taxes for a large economy, the United States, and a small open economy, Norway.

Berg-Taxing Corporate or Shareholder Income-149.pdf


Behavioural Responses To Tax Systems: Evidence From Costa Rica’s Corporate Tax Reform

Lucía Contreras1, Jonathan Garita2

1University of Manchester, United Kingdom; 2Central Bank of Costa Rica, Costa Rica

This paper examines firms’ behavioural responses to Costa Rica’s 2019 corporate tax reform, which reduced distortions in the tax system but decreased its simplicity. Using 2016–2023 corporate tax return data and a difference-in-differences design, we analyse how firms adjusted to the reform’s rich variation in marginal and average tax rates. Our descriptive analysis suggests the reform reduced revenue and cost manipulation, previously evident in bunching around revenue thresholds and profit margin discontinuities. Our causal findings reveal two main patterns. First, firms responded asymmetrically, reacting more strongly to tax cuts than to tax increases. This likely reflects the removal of growth barriers for small firms, or the downward stickiness of reported profits driven by evasion costs. Second, firms responded to marginal but not average tax rates, contrasting with evidence that individuals simplify tax schedules. These findings suggest that well-communicated reforms can improve efficiency without increasing compliance errors.

Contreras-Behavioural Responses To Tax Systems-311.pdf


Do Special Economic Zones Foster Economic Development? Evidence from South Africa

Matthew Amalitinga Abagna1, Ronald Davies2, Nadine Riedel3, Nora Strecker2, Biniyam Gezahegn Worku2

1Tax Justice Network; 2University College Dublin, Ireland; 3University of Münster

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have become an increasingly popular policy tool for promoting economic development and countries provide preferential tax incentives to attract firms into SEZs. Using unique South African administrative data—firm-level corporate tax returns merged with worker-level income tax returns—we propose an alternative method for identifying SEZ firms beyond self-reported data, based on tax payments and employee location. Additionally, we will examine how the establishment of SEZs changes the behaviour of firms within SEZs. We contribute to the literature by identifying firms that exploit preferential tax incentives of SEZs firms to avoid tax payments, despite not being entitled to such benefits, while also enhancing our understanding of the impact of SEZs in a developing country context.

Abagna-Do Special Economic Zones Foster Economic Development Evidence-333.pdf


Distributed Profit Taxes: Theoretical Insights and Empirical Implications

Mitali Das1, Ruud De Mooij2, Shafik Hebous3,5, Charles Vellutini4

1International Monetary Fund IMF, United States of America; 2International Monetary Fund IMF, United States of America; 3International Monetary Fund IMF, United States of America; 4International Monetary Fund IMF, United States of America; 5CESifo

The Distributed Profit Tax (DPT)—a system under which corporate taxes are deferred until profits are distributed to shareholders—has emerged as a prominent alternative to the traditional corporate income tax (CIT). This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the DPT, evaluating its theoretical foundations and empirical effects in five countries. We delineate the theoretical distinctions between the DPT, the S-based cash-flow tax, and the CIT, noting that the DPT’s implications for investment and financial structure are theoretically ambiguous. Our empirical analysis indicates that the adoption of DPTs is associated with a significant decline in profit tax revenue—approximately 1 percent of GDP, on average—alongside increased profit retentions and modest reductions in debt-to-asset ratios. In contrast, the effects on investment are statistically insignificant.

Das-Distributed Profit Taxes-431.pdf
 
2:15pm - 4:15pmB02: Minimum Corporate Tax and Firm Behavior
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Jakob Miethe, University of Munich
Discussant 1: Dave Goyvaerts, Ghent University
Discussant 2: Camille Semelet, ifo institute
Discussant 3: Jakob Miethe, University of Munich
Discussant 4: Tomas Boukal, Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences
 

Leveling Playing Field: Analysis Of Firm-Level Responses To The Introduction Of Global Minimum Tax

Tomas Boukal1, Petr Janský1, Niels Johannesen2, Miroslav Palanský1,3

1Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Czech Republic; 2Saïd Business School, Oxford University; 3Tax Justice Network, London, United Kingdom

We propose a methodology to estimate the impact of the 2024 global minimum tax on the effective tax rates of multinational enterprises. Using a dataset of 1,300 multinationals operating in Czechia from 2017 to 2022 (nearly 300,000 firm-country observations), we assess three main objectives of this reform: (i) increasing tax contributions, (ii) reducing profit shifting, and (iii) decreasing tax rate disparities. Our findings suggest that effective tax rates will rise significantly, increasing the average tax rate by approximately 4 percentage points and generating an additional €200 billion in revenue. This will also narrow intra-firm tax rate disparities, particularly affecting ‘internal profit centers’—affiliates with a high share of intra-firm revenue. Finally, by reducing tax rate differences across firms, the reform would result in a more equitable tax system, limiting profit-shifting opportunities for large multinationals and aligning their tax burdens more closely with smaller firms.

Boukal-Leveling Playing Field-405.pdf


Investor Expectations For The Pillar 2 Global Minimum Tax

Dave Goyvaerts

Ghent University, Belgium

In 2021, the OECD announced that over 130 jurisdictions supported its “Pillar 2” proposal for a 15 percent global minimum effective tax rate for large multinational enterprises. This proposal has since been adopted unanimously by the European Union, and has come into force on 1 January 2024. We employ an event study methodology using daily 2021 stock market returns of 1.782 EU and US firms to determine how Pillar 2 announcements affected the value of firms subject to the global minimum tax, and that of their competitors. We find a significant negative impact on the stock market returns of directly affected US firms, while the impact on EU firms appears to be limited, suggesting investors in EU are less worried about the impact of future anti-tax avoidance regulations. In our current specifications, we find no conclusive evidence of a causal effect on the stock market returns of their competitors.

Goyvaerts-Investor Expectations For The Pillar 2 Global Minimum Tax-434.pdf


Tax Reform, Foreign Investment, and Minimum Tax

Camille Semelet1,2,3

1ifo institute; 2LMU; 3World Bank

This paper examines the impact of the 2017 US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on the investment behavior of US multinational corporations (MNCs) in Germany. The TCJA introduced substantial corporate tax changes, including a reduction in the US corporate tax rate, full expensing of certain capital expenditures (bonus depreciation), and the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI) provision, which altered incentives for foreign investment. Using a triple difference-in-differences framework and firm-level data on foreign-owned subsidiaries in Germany, this paper investigates whether US MNCs reallocated investment towards the US or increased tangible investment in Germany in response to the tax cut and GILTI. The findings shed light on the trade-offs between tax-motivated profit shifting and real economic activity in high-tax jurisdictions.

Semelet-Tax Reform, Foreign Investment, and Minimum Tax-416.pdf


Who Faces the Global Minimum Tax? Group Size, Profit Shifting, and Policy Thresholds

Jakob Miethe1, Sarah Clifford2, Camille Semelet3

1University of Munich, Germany; 2University of Oxford; 3ifo institute

This paper characterizes profit shifting behaviour across the size distribution of multinational firms to evaluate the appropriate targeting of the recently introduced Global Minimum Tax (GMT). We document that the propensity to use tax haven subsidiaries increases substantially with group size. Second, we introduce a new methodology to estimate shifted profits at the group level and find an exponential group size gradient in profits shifted to tax havens. Lastly, we relate the potential tax revenue gains from the GMT to the compliance costs of MNEs and conclude that revenue gains clearly dominate compliance costs for large groups currently covered by the GMT and that potential net revenue gains from lowering the threshold are modest.

Miethe-Who Faces the Global Minimum Tax Group Size, Profit Shifting, and Policy-414.pdf
 
Date: Thursday, 21/Aug/2025
2:00pm - 4:00pmC02: Profit Shifting, Anti-Avoidance, and Developing Countries
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Mazhar Waseem, University of Manchester
Discussant 1: Alice Chiocchetti, Paris School of Economics
Discussant 2: Matthew Amalitinga Abagna, Tax Justice Network
Discussant 3: Mazhar Waseem, University of Manchester
Discussant 4: Andreas Möller, University of Bonn
 

Tears in Haven? Evidence from South Africa on Multinational Tax Avoidance and the Effects of Anti-Profit Shifting Measures

Andreas Möller1, Riedel Nadine2, Valeria Merlo3, Georg Wamser3

1University of Bonn, Germany; 2University of Münster; 3University of Tübingen

Over the past two decades, governments have introduced measures to curb multinational tax avoidance, yet evidence from low- and middle-income countries remains scarce. This paper presents new findings from South Africa, linking administrative trade and corporate tax data to assess the effects of key anti-avoidance reforms. We examine two OECD BEPS initiatives, Country-by-Country Reporting and enhanced transfer pricing documentation, alongside the domestic implementation of an earnings-stripping rule that restricts interest deductibility.Using difference-in-differences estimators, we find that BEPS reforms significantly reduced transfer mispricing, lowering intra-firm prices and traded quantities with tax havens. Similarly, the debt-related reform resulted in a measurable reduction in the use of debt financing, while we do not observe any negative real effects for treated firms. Our findings offer novel evidence on the effectiveness of international tax reforms in reducing profit shifting in a developing country context.

Möller-Tears in Haven Evidence from South Africa on Multinational Tax Avoidance and the-388.pdf


The Global Allocation of Extractive Windfalls

Ninon Moreau-Kastler1,2, Alice Chiocchetti1,2

1Paris School of Economics, France; 2EUTax Observatory

Using a newly available exhaustive and granular dataset on the worldwide activity of multinational firms matched with oil, gas & mining production data at the country and firm level, we find evidence that windfall profits of multinational firms are excessively booked in low-tax countries. To identify the effect of price shocks on worldwide profit allocation, we exploit the heterogeneity in commodity price changes across mining and oil & gas products and use the fact that extractive firms specialize in different commodities. We find that a one percent increase in commodity prices leads to a 0.7pp excess increase in profits of subsidiaries located in tax havens.

Moreau-Kastler-The Global Allocation of Extractive Windfalls-381.pdf


Detecting Profit Shifting in Administrative Data: A South African Perspective

Matthew Amalitinga Abagna1, Ronald B Davies2, Miroslav Palansk´3

1Tax Justice Network, Ghana; 2University College Dublin, Skatteforsk; 3Tax Justice Network, Charles University Prague

How can tax authorities in low-income countries identify multinational enterprises (MNEs) engaged in profit shifting? In this project, we introduce a low-cost, data-driven methodology to identify profit-shifting MNEs using administrative data readily available to tax authorities in South Africa. By applying panel regression analysis and probabilistic detection methods, the method generates a variety of "red flags" for firms involved in suspicious activities, enabling tax authorities to prioritize high-risk cases for further auditing within their existing resource constraints. This approach empowers resource-limited tax authorities to target high-risk profit-shifting cases, supporting South Africa's broader revenue mobilization and fiscal sustainability goals. We contribute to the literature on profit shifting by presenting a novel method for identifying profit-shifting behaviours, which can be adapted by other low-income countries facing similar challenges.

Abagna-Detecting Profit Shifting in Administrative Data-282.pdf


Intended and Unintended Consequences of Anti-Avoidance Rules: Evidence from Uganda

Mazhar Waseem1, Muhammad Bashir2, Usama Jamal1, Kyle McNabb3

1University of Manchester, United Kingdom; 2University of California, Berkeley; 3World Bank

Aggressive profit shifting by MNEs is a growing concern for domestic resource mobilization in developing economies. This paper evaluates the revenue and welfare consequences of a flagship anti-avoidance rule that has been implemented in morethan45countries to prevent profit shifting by MNEs through the debt channel. Our focus is Uganda, a representative developing country which implemented the rule in 2018. Exploiting admin data comprising the universe of corporate tax returns, we find that the rule does not significantly increase profits reported by MNEs in Uganda or tax remitted by them in Uganda. As an unintended consequence, however, the implementation of the rule leads to a contraction in real economic activity, reducing the turnover, employment, and trade of treated MNEs. We highlight the limited targeting efficiency of the rule, questioning its overall effects on welfare.

Waseem-Intended and Unintended Consequences of Anti-Avoidance Rules-241.pdf
 
4:30pm - 6:30pmD02: Taxpayer Mobility and Evasion
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Dirk Foremny, Universitat de Barcelona / IEB
Discussant 1: Salla Mari Annika Kalin, University Of Helsinki
Discussant 2: Dirk Foremny, Universitat de Barcelona / IEB
Discussant 3: Hannah Gundert, ZEW Mannheim
 

Free to Roam, Hard to Tax? Assessing the Tax Implications of Digital Nomad Visas in the EU

Hannah Gundert1,2, Julia Spix1,2

1ZEW Mannheim, Germany; 2University of Mannheim

Digital nomad visas (DNVs) offer digital nomads a cost-effective way to strategically choose their tax residence country, in addition to providing other direct tax incentives. This paper examines the effective tax burden of digital nomads under these visas in the EU in a simulation analysis. Our preliminary findings indicate that digital nomads with a taxable nexus in the United States or the United Kingdom can achieve a lower effective personal income tax burden by working from EU countries that offer DNVs. Moreover, we employ travel data of digital nomads to gain insights into their movement patterns and the resulting tax revenue implications. Consistent with the tax advantages associated with these visas, we find that destinations offering DNVs attract digital nomads more frequently than those without such a visa.

Gundert-Free to Roam, Hard to Tax Assessing the Tax Implications-318.pdf


Pensioners Without Borders: Agglomeration and the Migration Response to Taxation

Salla Mari Annika Kalin1,2, Antoine Levy3, Mathilde Muñoz4

1University Of Helsinki, Finland; 2The Labour Institute for Economic Research; 3UC Berkeley Haas; 4UC Berkeley

This paper investigates whether and why pensioners move across borders in response to tax rate differentials. In 2013, retirees relocating to Portugal became eligible to a full tax exemption of foreign-source pensions. Contrary to the broadly held belief that seniors "age in place", we find substantial international mobility responses to the reform, concentrated among wealthy and educated pensioners in higher-tax origin countries. The implied migration elasticity of the stock of foreign pensioners to the net-of-tax rate is large (between 1.5 and 2) and increases at longer horizons. Tax-induced retirement migration clusters in space, and exhibits peer effects, amplification, and hysteresis patterns consistent with agglomeration through endogenous amenities. We show such forces theoretically and empirically have significant implications for optimal tax rates, and for the limited efficacy of unilateral policy responses to tax competition, like the source-based taxation of pensions.

Kalin-Pensioners Without Borders-363.pdf


Golden Visas and Real Estate Markets

Dirk Foremny1, Zhengming Li2, Clara Martínez-Toledano2, Mariona Segú3

1Universitat de Barcelona / IEB, Spain; 2Imperial College London; 3CY Cergy Paris Université

This paper studies the impact of investor citizenship and residence schemes on local real estate markets. We do so by examining the Spanish golden visa programme that was introduced in 2013 and grants visas and full residence rights to foreign investors who invest at least 500,000 Euro in the Spanish real estate market. First, the number of real estate transactions above the threshold increased by 43% more for non-EU relative to EU and Spanish investors after the introduction of the programme. Second, non-EU investors appear to pay a premium of 11,421 Euro around the threshold relative to EU and Spaniards. Finally, we find that the programme had spillover effects on the real estate market. The average increase in golden visa exposure increases overall real estate transaction prices on average by 0.19% after the introduction of the scheme.

Foremny-Golden Visas and Real Estate Markets-202.pdf
 
Date: Friday, 22/Aug/2025
9:30am - 10:30amE: Mentoring II: Mentoring session: Navigating the first few years as an assistant professor
Location: SS5
With: • Erika Deserranno • Abigail Payne • Dina Pomeranz • Mazhar Waseem
11:00am - 1:00pmF02: Quantifying Profit Shifting
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Ron Davies, University College Dublin
Discussant 1: Johannes Kochems, University of Cologne
Discussant 2: Jakob Brounstein, Institute for Fiscal Studies
Discussant 3: Ron Davies, University College Dublin
Discussant 4: Ruby Doeleman, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
 

Matching Tax Returns and Financial Statement Data to Measure Income Shifting

Harald Amberger, Ruby Doeleman, Stefanie Pendl

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

We match corporate tax return data with financial statement data to estimate tax-motivated cross-border income shifting in Austria. Our baseline estimate indicates a tax semi-elasticity of taxable income reported on corporate tax returns of -0.9. In contrast, we find little evidence of income shifting when using financial statement profits to proxy for taxable income -- a common approach in prior research. However, adjusting financial statement profits for tax-exempt dividend income yields estimates consistent with our main findings. Additional tests indicate that failing to account for dividend income can distort inferences about the relevance of specific income-shifting strategies. Our findings highlight that using financial statement data to approximate taxable income can affect the reliability of income-shifting estimates.

Amberger-Matching Tax Returns and Financial Statement Data-171.pdf


Local Tax Havens

Johannes Kochems

University of Cologne, Germany

This paper analyzes the fiscal impact of corporate profit shifting to local business tax havens in Germany. Similar to international tax havens, municipalities in Germany have an incentive to reduce their local business tax (LBT) rate to attract corporate profits. I define local tax havens as low-tax municipalities close to large agglomeration areas. I use synthetic difference-in-differences methods together with administrative data sources to estimate the amount of profit shifting to local tax havens. Between 2013 and 2019, around 74 billion Euros were shifted to local tax havens. The results are driven by a small number of large firms that offer business and financial services. The fiscal cost to non-tax haven municipalities amounts to roughly 11 billion Euros.

Kochems-Local Tax Havens-285.pdf


The Three Body Problem: Ecuador’s Tax On Tax Haven Ownership

Pierre Jean Bachas1, Jakob Brounstein2, Alex Bajaña3

1World Bank; 2Institute for Fiscal Studies; 3Servicio Renta Interna Ecuador

Can a country reduce its exposure to tax havens, and what are the consequences? We analyze the effects of Ecuador’s corporate tax surcharge for firms with owners in tax havens. The reform was made possible by the prior establishment of an ownership registry. Comparing the behavior of firms with tax-haven owners at baseline (exposed firms), versus other foreign-owned firms, we find that the reform induced 12 percent of exposed firms to reduce tax haven ownership to zero. Exposed firms report owners in non-haven countries that tend to be individuals rather than firms, thus raising beneficial ownership transparency. Exposed firms also increase tax payments by 15%, without reducing employment and investment in Ecuador. Yet, transactions between exposed firms and tax haven parties did not fall. Overall, the policy which combined a “flashlight” (the ownership registry) and a “stick” (the tax surcharge) seemed effective at raising transparency and mitigating tax erosion.

Bachas-The Three Body Problem-152.pdf


Identifying Profit Shifting from Administrative Data

Gerald Agaba2, Ron Davies1,4,5, Kyle McNabb3, Miroslav Palanský5,6

1University College Dublin, Ireland; 2Uganda Revenue Authority; 3ODI, London; Center for Tax Analysis in Developing Countries; 4Skatteforsk; 5Tax Justice Network; 6Charles University

It is well-known that some multinationals shift profits to tax havens. By manipulating the cost of intra-firm transactions, these firms artificially lower their tax base and the reduce the effectiveness of the tax authority. While this can be countered by monitoring and audits, such efforts are costly. Here, we present a data-driven approach to identifying potential profit shifters to better target limited audit resources. By comparing actual data from individual firms' tax returns in Ugandan administrative to broader industry trends, the method identifies when a given firm's behaviour seems unlikely in the absence of profit shifting. The method indicates that fewer of 3% of multinationals in Uganda exhibit such behaviour with four firms making up over 90% of potentially lost tax revenues. Thus, our methodology is a feasible and low cost method of targeting audits.

Agaba-Identifying Profit Shifting from Administrative Data-249.pdf
 
2:15pm - 4:15pmG02: The Effects of BEPS and Minimum Taxation on Profit Shifting
Location: SS5
Session Chair: Alessandro Chiari, CORPTAX, Charles University
Discussant 1: Tomas Boukal, Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences
Discussant 2: Alessandro Chiari, CORPTAX, Charles University
Discussant 3: Johannes Julius Gaul, Universität Mannheim and ZEW
 

The Effect of Global Anti-Tax Avoidance Efforts on Sub-National Profit Shifting

Johannes J. Gaul1,2, Inga Schulz1

1Universität Mannheim, Germany; 2ZEW, Germany

This paper studies whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) respond to international anti-tax

avoidance regulations by increasing local profit shifting activities. Within Germany, local variation of profit tax rates facilitate similar avoidance strategies on a sub-national level through the use of intellectual property or financing structures. We study whether these local schemes serve as complements orsubstitutes for international profit shifting. To explore the use of local profit shifting activities by MNEs, we construct a novel database documenting the network structures of MNEs that link international to sub-national tax havens. We hypothesize that MNEs intensify their domestic tax avoidance practices in response to stricter international regulations. Our findings highlight the adaptive strategies of MNEs in response to evolving international tax policies and underscore the complexity of recent anti-tax avoidance regulations and their consequences at both the international and local level.

Gaul-The Effect of Global Anti-Tax Avoidance Efforts on Sub-National Profit Shifting-281.pdf


Global Minimum Tax and Profit Shifting

Tomas Boukal1, Petr Janský1, Miroslav Palanský1,2

1Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Czech Republic; 2Tax Justice Network, London, United Kingdom

We develop a methodology to decompose the tax revenue impact of the global minimum tax introduced in 2024 into several components and quantify its potential impact on profit shifting. We apply it to 34 thousand multinational-country observations from tax returns, financial statements and country-by-country reports of all multinationals active in Slovakia. We find that the global minimum tax has the potential to decrease profit shifting by most multinationals, which are on average likely to pay higher effective tax rates in most countries worldwide post-reform. We find that Slovak corporate tax revenues will increase by 4%, with half of the increase due to its minimum top-up taxes. The other half of the increase is corporate income tax on profits that will no longer be shifted out of the country. We expect the global minimum tax to target 49% of previously shifted profits.

Boukal-Global Minimum Tax and Profit Shifting-340.pdf


Global Minimum Tax: a stress test for Banks?

Alessandro Chiari

CORPTAX, Charles University

We study the potential impact of the OECD Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) minimum tax on banks, combining a theoretical model with a new cross-country dataset of bank-level tax haven exposure and profitability. We show that the policy affects banks’ effective tax burden, their internal capital markets, and ultimately their financial stability metrics under Basel III. A dynamic stress-testing simulation and a difference-indifferences analysis reveal that banks with significant tax haven profit shares are more sensitive to post-GloBE regulatory shocks.

Chiari-Global Minimum Tax-180.pdf