Some fringe candidates, previously dismissed, have seen unexpected surges in popularity. We explore this issue by focusing on the dynamic interplay between social norms and elections. We develop a two-period electoral competition model with a mainstream candidate and a fringe candidate. Because the fringe candidate claims an extreme view that contravenes social norms, voting for her is stigmatized. We show that a sufficient vote share of the fringe candidate in the first period signals wider acceptance of the extreme view, eroding established norms even if the fringe candidate loses in the election. This triggers the rise of the fringe candidate in the second period. To induce the erosion of the norm, the fringe candidate tries to differentiate from the mainstream candidate on standard issues, whereas the mainstream candidate imitates the fringe candidate. Furthermore, heightened social norms in the initial election might enhance the future success of the fringe candidate.

In this paper, we formulate a general equilibrium theory that explains the existence and stability of democratically elected governments that support certain groups of individuals in society (insiders) to the detriment of everybody else (outsiders), even if the latter constitute a majority. The vehicle is a dynamic general equilibrium model, where insiders get monopoly rents and outsiders get less than what they would have gotten under a common good regime. We construct such political economy equilibria and we identify the conditions under which such political regimes (coalitions of insiders): (a) can safeguard against opportunistic behavior (i.e., do not fall from within) and (b) may come to power in the first place (i.e., manage to get elected). To that end, we highlight the role of ideology or self-serving bias as a gluing device to garner an electable coalition.

We present a model that integrates electoral competition of majority-minority redistricting with legislative redistribution to optimize minority representation. Analyzing voter allocation's impact, we find that minorities with limited political power benefit from concentrated districts, while stronger minorities prefer dispersed voter distributions. Majority voters voting for minorities has two effects: it helps minorities gain offices, but it may increase majority voters' influence and policy benefits. Paradoxically, adding minorities to a district is non-monotonic and can result in representatives less favored by minorities. The interplay between redistricting, electoral competition, and policy distribution offers novel insights into equitable minority representation and public policy.

We construct a unifying model of optimal decentralized policymaking that includes multiple tax and spending policies with mobile workers, mobile residents, and mobile capital. Local governments are linked by commuting patterns, the cost of which is endogenously determined by congestion. Both industrial capital and residential property taxes cause fiscal externalities on other jurisdictions, but these externalties arise because of the movement of workers and households, not through the movement of capital. The city-suburb commuting relationships give rise to asymmetric policy choices of each jurisdiction. Employment-based taxes are valuable when jurisdictions are net recipients of commuters, while jurisdictions that are net providers of commuters will choose to rely on the use of residential-based taxes. Cities will rely on commercial capital taxes and employment income taxes, while suburbs will rely on residential property taxes and residential head taxes.