Defense spending accounts for a large share of the budget in many countries, but the value of the resulting public good - national defense – has so far escaped assessment. Much of the literature has instead considered indirect benefits of defense spending. In this paper, we assess the direct welfare effects of defense policy, namely an increase in the security of citizens, by means of a survey-based discrete choice experiment. Drawing on a representative sample of the German population, results suggest substantial willingness to pay for an increase in troop numbers, the establishment of a European army and an improved air defense system. The reintroduction of compulsory military service does not enjoy public support. Results further indicate substantial preference heterogeneity across respondents and policy options which we explore. As such, these findings demonstrate how methods of survey-based, non-market valuation can help to refine research in this area of public policy.

This paper investigates how the war in Ukraine has affected the opinions and values of the Russian population. Using data from the Gallup World Poll and the Levada Center, changes in political support for Putin, willingness to migrate, life satisfaction, future optimism, and attitudes towards the West are analyzed. The focus is on the effects of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the impact of the military mobilization of young men in September of the same year. We also use data on Russian war victims to examine potential regional differences in Russia.

Are sanctions bypassed by hiding money offshore? Using bilateral data on bank deposits, we compare how offshore deposits from sanctioned versus non-sanctioned countries develop after the US and EU impose financial sanctions. Financial sanctions against individuals increase offshore deposits as (potential) targets attempt to hide their funds. We additionally analyze an example of such sanctions imposed against Russia in 2014 using a synthetic control approach. Offshore deposits originating from Russia increase substantially.

Much like the exploitation of global trade by the first multinationals, early space commerce has the potential to lead to significant conflict as privateers seek to use force to capture resources from others. Governments currently subsidize research increasing such disruptive capabilities despite the fact that international law makes governments -- not firms -- liable for damages. We show that this can be explained in a setting where the potential possibility of conflict affects the terms of an agreement outlawing them. In essence, by increasing the conflict capabilities of one's own firms, this enables a government to push for a more favorable treaty. We demonstrate that under plausible assumptions, this works to the benefit of technologically-advanced nations. Thus, subsidizing current space activities is likely to cement current international income inequality.