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Overview and details of the sessions of this online conference.

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Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 27th Nov 2021, 03:05:38am GMT

 
 
Session Overview
Session
E03: Banking
Time:
Thursday, 19/Aug/2021:
12:30pm - 2:00pm


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Presentations
12:30pm - 12:52pm

Covid 19 Stimulus Package and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Linkages: Empirical Evidence from India

Lekha Chakraborty1, Harikrishnan S2

1NIPFP, India; 2Independent analyst

Against the backdrop of covid pandemic, there is a growing concern about the tendency of segregating the monetary and fiscal policy while assessing the financing of deficits on economic growth outcomes. This paper analyses the economic stimulus packages announced by the national government in the context of India and identify the plausible fiscal and monetary policy co-ordination. The shrinking fiscal space due to revenue uncertainties has led to a theoretical plausibility of a re-emergence of finite monetization of deficits in India. However, the empirical evidence confirms no direct monetization of deficit.

Chakraborty-Covid 19 Stimulus Package and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Linkages-526.pdf


12:52pm - 1:15pm

Welfare Effects in a Banking Union Without Centralized Regulation

Ulf Maier, Miriam Müting

University of Munich, Germany

We study the interaction between the capital regulation and supervision of multinational banks when the latter is centralized. Both, stricter regulation and stricter supervision have positive international externalities in that they reduce the intrabank cost of cross-subsidizing failing subsidiaries abroad. We show that stricter, centralized supervision leads to more lenient capital regulation at the national level. We identify the cases in which the too lenient regulation overcompensates the global welfare gain of stricter supervision. In these cases, moving towards a supervisory union reduces global welfare.

Maier-Welfare Effects in a Banking Union Without Centralized Regulation-545.pdf


1:15pm - 1:37pm

C and S Corporation Banks: Did Trump’s Tax Reform Lead to Differential Effects?

Hoang Ha Nguyen Thi1, Alfons Weichenrieder1,2,3

1Goethe University Frankfurt; 2Vienna University of Economics and Business; 3CESifo

The US Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) led to a drastic reduction in the corporate tax and improved the treatment of C corporations compared to S corporations. We study the differential effect of the TCJA on these types of corporations using key economic variables of US banks, such as the number of employees, average salaries and benefits, profit/loss before taxes, and net income. Our analysis suggests that the TCJA increased the net-of-tax profits of C corporation banks compared to S corporations and, to a lesser extent, their pre-tax profits. At the same time, the reform triggered no significantly differential effect on the employment and average wages.

Nguyen Thi-C and S Corporation Banks-233.pdf


1:37pm - 2:00pm

Bailout And Regulatory Decisions In A Banking Union

Andreas Haufler

LMU Munich, Germany

We model a banking union of two countries whose banking sectors differ in their average probability of failure and externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory decision of which banks are to be shut down before they can go bankrupt, and (ii) a loss allocation -- or bailout -- decision of who pays for banks that have failed despite regulatory oversight. Each of these choices can either be taken in a centralized or in a decentralized way. In our benchmark model the two countries always agree on a centralized regulation policy. In contrast, bailout policies are centralized only when international spillovers from cross-border bank ownership are strong, and banking sectors are highly profitable.

Haufler-Bailout And Regulatory Decisions In A Banking Union-266.pdf


 
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