Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this online conference.

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The last speaker of each session is the session chair. The discussant is always the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. Each paper has a 22-minutes-block in all sessions. There should be 15 minutes and no more than 18 minutes for the presenter. The discussion is then started by the discussant. Please note that the role of the discussant is different compared to previous years: The discussant has only 1-2 minutes and s/he is not allowed to give a lengthy summary of the paper together with comprehensive comments. Instead, her/his task is to raise one single question/comment and, in doing so, start the general discussion! All participants are asked to be strict in timing to allow people to change sessions during the general discussion. For a (rare) session with less papers in the session than the time slot allows, stick to the congress schedule and use 22 minutes per presentation to allow listeners to smoothly change between sessions.

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Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 2nd Dec 2021, 12:56:16pm GMT

Session Overview
D07: Health Policy
Thursday, 19/Aug/2021:
10:45am - 12:15pm

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10:45am - 11:07am

Prescription Behaviour of Doctors in the Public and Private Sector

Elina Jussila1, Kaisa Kotakorpi1,2, Jouko Verho2

1Tampere University, Finland; 2VATT Institute for Economic Research

We analyze differences in the prescription behaviour of doctors in the public and private sector. We conduct the analysis in the context of two case studies, treatment of high cholesterol and type 2 diabetes, which are both very important for both public health and healthcare costs. Both cases are characterised by the availability of an effective, widely accepted low-cost treatment and alternative, more expensive treatments for the same condition. We find that in both cases, doctors are more likely to prescribe the expensive alternative in the private sector. The result holds also after controlling for a wide variety of individual-level factors such as income and health indicators, as well as some physician-level factors.

Jussila-Prescription Behaviour of Doctors in the Public and Private Sector-424.pdf

11:07am - 11:30am

Estimating Marginal Internalities: a New Approach

Zarko Yordanov Kalamov

TU Berlin, Germany

Consumers of sin goods often do not take the full health costs of consumption into account. Thus, they impose an internality on their future selves. Hence, one of the main sufficient statistics for an optimal sin tax is the money-metric of the marginal internality. This paper develops a model where a sin good consumer may exert an internality because of both a self-control problem and biased beliefs about the future health harms. We exploit a relationship between the health insurance elasticity of sin good demand and the marginal internality to estimate the latter. We calibrate our estimation approach to sugary drinks consumption. Our estimates are within the range of measures, derived from surveys that elicit directly consumers' nutritional knowledge and self-control.

Kalamov-Estimating Marginal Internalities-384.pdf

11:30am - 11:52am

Contracted Labor Mobility and Migrant Self-selection on Job Match Quality

Juho Alasalmi1,2

1University of Konstanz, Germany; 2Pellervo Economic Research, Finland

Contracted migrants observe their wages in the source and destination locations before their migration choice. With wage dispersion, migration choices are not based on mean or variance of source and destination wage distributions but on specific realizations from these distributions. The deviations of wage realizations from their expectations, the job match qualities in the source and destination, become factors of selection. The Roy-Borjas model extended by wage dispersion in source and destination labor markets predicts negative selection on source and positive selection on destination job match quality. Mobility costs amplify selection on job match quality. I discuss how comparison of migrants and stayers is not helpful in identifying selection on job match quality and instead, using Finnish administrative data, compare contracted migrants to workers who similarly contract a job outside their region of residence but choose to commute. Comparison of groups facing different costs reveals selection on job match quality.

Alasalmi-Contracted Labor Mobility and Migrant Self-selection-290.pdf

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