Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this online conference.

Please select a date to show only sessions at that day. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

Activate "Show Presentations" and enter your name in the search field in order to find your function (s), like presenter, discussant, chair.

Some information on the session logistics:

The last speaker of each session is the session chair. The discussant is always the following speaker, with the first speaker being the discussant of the last paper. Each paper has a 22-minutes-block in all sessions. There should be 15 minutes and no more than 18 minutes for the presenter. The discussion is then started by the discussant. Please note that the role of the discussant is different compared to previous years: The discussant has only 1-2 minutes and s/he is not allowed to give a lengthy summary of the paper together with comprehensive comments. Instead, her/his task is to raise one single question/comment and, in doing so, start the general discussion! All participants are asked to be strict in timing to allow people to change sessions during the general discussion. For a (rare) session with less papers in the session than the time slot allows, stick to the congress schedule and use 22 minutes per presentation to allow listeners to smoothly change between sessions.

Only registered participants can attend this online conference. Further information available on the congress website .

Please note that all times are shown in the time zone of the conference. The current conference time is: 2nd Dec 2021, 01:37:16pm GMT

Session Overview
E06: Tax Evasion
Thursday, 19/Aug/2021:
12:30pm - 2:00pm

Show help for 'Increase or decrease the abstract text size'
12:30pm - 12:52pm

Tax Policies Design in a Hierarchical Two-Side Model with Occupational Decision

Sebastián Castillo

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile

This study incorporates the occupational decision, i.e. dependent and self-employed, into the hierarchical model of Sanchez and Sobel (1993) to investigate distortions in tax policies design. The optimal audit shows that audits are efficient below a cut-off level, and above this level, audits are equal to zero. The marginal tax rate is smaller than one, indicating that not considering occupational decisions produces an upward bias on taxes. The optimal IRS's budget does not allow auditing the entire self-employed sector but it is larger than the result from a cost-benefit analysis. Finally, differential taxation is optimal if the marginal tax rate in the self-employed sector is higher than the dependent sector. This result produces that the distortions in the optimal allocation of agents increase in comparison with an environment with only one marginal tax rate.

Castillo-Tax Policies Design in a Hierarchical Two-Side Model with Occupational Decision-105.pdf

12:52pm - 1:15pm

The Effect of Audit Threats and Moral Appeals on Tax Compliance of Small Firms: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Bulgaria

Philipp Doerrenberg1, Alina Pfrang1, Jan Schmitz2

1University of Mannheim, Germany; 2University of Nijmegen, Netherlands

We study tax compliance and enforcement of VAT and SSCs in a field experiment with SMEs in Bulgaria. By randomly allocating treatment mailings to taxpayers, the effectiveness of audit-threats and tax morale in raising tax compliance is investigated. A special interest lies on evaluating whether businesses react to moral appeals from the tax authority. Preliminary results suggest that the treatments are especially successful in raising compliance with SSCs among firms. The results show that both audit-threats and moral appeals are effective in increasing subsequent SSC reporting.

Doerrenberg-The Effect of Audit Threats and Moral Appeals on Tax Compliance of Small Firms-257.pdf

1:15pm - 1:37pm

Does Shaming Pay?: Evaluating California’s Top 500 Tax Delinquent Publication Program

Chad Angaretis1, Brian David Galle2, Paul Organ3, Allen Prohofsky1

1California Franchise Tax Board; 2Georgetown University, United States of America; 3University of Michigan

We present new evidence on the impact of shaming on tax compliance, drawing on non-public administrative data from the world’s fifth-largest economy. Taxpayers notified that they will be publicly identified as one of the jurisdiction's largest tax debtors respond dramatically to treatment, with large and significant changes in extensive-margin behaviors such as entering into a payment agreement. Intensive-margin effects are smaller, suggesting that liquidity constraints may explain a large portion of non-payment. We also explore the effects of professional license suspension on these outcomes.

Our results derive from real-world policy, not an experiment. But by exploiting bright-line cutoffs in treatment eligibility by dollar and ordinal ranking, we are able to argue that observed effects are very likely causal.

Angaretis-Does Shaming Pay-228.pdf

Contact and Legal Notice · Contact Address:
Privacy Statement · Conference: IIPF 2021
Conference Software - ConfTool Pro 2.6.142
© 2001 - 2021 by Dr. H. Weinreich, Hamburg, Germany