Conference Agenda

Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).

 
Session Overview
Session
6.08: Reactor licensing
Time:
Wednesday, 18/Mar/2020:
2:00pm - 3:30pm

Session Chair: Tania VENEAU, EDF, France
Location: B-1049

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Presentations

Licensing of Imports and Exports of Nuclear Material and certain Equipment, Software and Technology for the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant Project

Maryam Salem Alsehaimy, Eva Gyane, Abdulla Waleed Al Hashmi, Mohamed Saeed Al Katheeri

Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR)

In 2009 the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE’s) Emirates Nuclear Energy Company (ENEC) concluded a contract with Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) for the construction of four APR-1400 reactors at Barakah in Abu Dhabi Emirate. Based on the “Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy” the UAE voluntarily committed adhering to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers. In 2009, the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) was established as the regulatory body for the UAE’s nuclear sector. The Export/Import Section in the Safeguards Department was tasked with establishing and implementing processes to control transfers (imports, exports, re-exports, transits and transshipments) of regulated items into/from the State, based on the NSG Guidelines. In 2012 FANR issued a construction licence for Barakah Units 1 and 2, based on a blanket single assurance with the Republic of Korea, for the import of trigger list items. The construction licence for Units 3 and 4 was issued in 2014. The transfer of nuclear material and trigger list items requires government to government assurances with the Supplier States. Additional licences are required for the import of any equipment containing nuclear material and nuclear related dual use items.FANR conducts quarterly inspections at Barakah in order to verify the equipment and technology imported during the preceding quarter. This information forms the basis for the quarterly declarations submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency under the UAE’s Additional Protocol.FANR is in the process of issuing the operating licence for Barakah Unit 1 for the lifetime of this unit.The control of a large number of Trigger List items constituted a major challenge for all stakeholders. Processes have improved substantially over the years. A sound import/export control system contributes towards the aspired excellence of the Barakah project.



The European Utility Requirements for Advanced LWR Recent Activities and New Challenges

Jean-Francois Vivier1, Manuel Carrasco1, Olli Kymalainen2, Vincent Sorel1

1Electricité de France (EdF); 2Fortum

Since 1991, the European Utility Requirements (EUR) organisation has been developing and promoting harmonised technical specifications for the new mid- and large-size LWR designs to be proposed by the vendors in Europe. Thirteen nuclear operators across Europe are members of the Organisation.

The EUR Document consists of a comprehensive set of requirements covering the whole Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). It encompasses all aspects (safety, performance, competitiveness) and all parts of a NPP (nuclear island and conventional island). The document can be used by the utilities (guide for design assessment, technical reference for call for bids) and by the vendors, as a technical guide.

The presentation will describe the main results obtained during the last years and the new challenges for the coming three years (roadmap 2019-2021) in the three following fields.

1. The revision E of the EUR document has been issued in December 2016. It includes: revised safety requirements taking into account the most recent European and international safety standards issued by WENRA and AIEA, the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, and the most recent international standards, for example for I&C.

2. The assessment of new designs. The Korean KHNP’s EU-APR and the Russian AEP’s VVER TOI designs have been assessed against the revision D recently. One new design assessment is in progress (namely Chinese CGN’s EU HPR1000). The presentation will briefly recall the EUR design assessment objectives and process and the progress of the different assessment projects.

3. The road map 2019-2021. Most important topics of this road map are:

• Issue of papers for evolution of EUR document: integration of SMRs, accident tolerant fuel, etc…

• Develop interactions with other stakeholders: IAEA, WENRA, ENISS, WNA/CORDEL, EPRI/URD, etc…

• Promote EUR document and EUR assessments, open EUR organisation to other European utilities



Perspectives on the Canadian Regulatory Approach to the Design and Safety Analysis for Small Modular Reactors

Raoul Awad

Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation-FANR

Over the past few years, the nuclear industry has shown an ever-increasing interest in the development of small, factory-built reactors dubbed as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). This has been manifested in several applications to the nuclear regulator in Canada (the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, CNSC) for the Vendor Design Review (VDR) services. The VDR is an optional service provided by the CNSC in order to identify and resolve potential regulatory or technical issues early in the design process. The objective of a pre-licensing review is to increase regulatory certainty while ensuring public safety. However, this service does not certify a reactor design, and does not involve the issuance of a license under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA).

In order to achieve higher efficiency, most of the new designs are proposed to operate at elevated temperatures and under high neutron flux. In addition, a wide range of coolants, other than water (e.g. molten salts, liquid metals) and a variety of fuel designs and compositions are suggested for the new SMRs. Most of these SMRs mainly rely on the inherent features and passive systems as primary methods to control the reactivity, to shut down the reactor, and to mitigate the consequences of unanticipated reactor conditions. These developments have opened a completely new discussion and posed a set of questions about the applicability and the interpretation of the current regulatory documents to the emerging technologies.

The regulatory framework in Canada stipulates that the reactor design must comply with the regulatory document REGDOC 2.5.2 [1], and the deterministic safety analysis must comply with the regulatory document REGDOC 2.4.1 [2].



 
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