This talk outlines an unorthodox view of grounding that solves problems with generalisations and negations. Concerning conjunctions, the principle that any contents p, q jointly ground (p & q) mirrors an introduction rule and a principle of semantic composition for conjunctive sentences. The strategy is to model other grounding principles after similar introduction and composition principles. Grounding is construed as non-factual but as reality-transferring: the truth of p, q is transferred to (p & q). Universal generalisations are not grounded by their instances (plus some dubious totality fact). Instead, the grounding is trans-categorial: any predicable F grounds (everything Fs); predicable F’s reality status of being present at every object is transformed into the truth of (everything Fs). Applied to existential generalisations, this predicables account solves Fine’s puzzles. The account of the grounding of negations assumes grounding by absence: any content p grounds its negation not-p; the irreality (falsity) of the ground is transformed into the reality (truth) of the groundee. A moderate Platonism is suggested: grounding facts are non-worldly though objective facts that correspond to our introductory inferential practices; they generate logical structures in the concrete world without such structures having to be part of the world in advance.

Until recently, metaphysical foundationalism, i.e., the idea that there are fundamental (ungrounded) facts that serve as the metaphysical (explanatory) basis of all derivative facts, was the dominant view about the structure of reality. Recently, however, more and more philosophers have raised objections against metaphysical foundationalism and developed rival views, such as metaphysical infinitism and coherentism. It has been argued that those rival views can accommodate the explanatory desiderata of a theory of the structure of the world at least as well as metaphysical foundationalism, if not better. The paper investigates the dialectic of the debate between metaphysical foundationalism vs. anti-foundationalism, by paying special attention to infinitism. It targets a key assumption in the discussion by arguing that the real issue isn’t which theory best meets a fixed set of explanatory desiderata, but rather what those very desiderata should be in the first place.

My aim in this talk is to investigate the relationship between the following three doctrines: (i) normative non-naturalism, (ii) the supervenience of the normative on the natural, and (iii) essentialism about metaphysical necessity, the view that metaphysical necessity is reducible to essence. Gideon Rosen (2020), elaborating on an argument by Kit Fine (2002), has recently argued that these three doctrines form an inconsistent triad. I will argue on the basis of the higher-order logic of essence HLE developed in Ditter (2022) that Rosen’s argument fails and I will establish the joint consistency of the three doctrines within the framework of HLE. The talk will also illustrate how methods from higher-order metaphysics can be brought to bear on questions about the metaphysics of properties.

A recently emerged form of deflationism about metaphysical modality (Clarke-Doane 2019, 2021; Priest 2021) challenges the very project of defining what metaphysical modality really is. Rather than reducing it to another modal or non-modal notion (e.g., apriority or analyticity), new deflationists argue that the concept of metaphysical necessity is intrinsically indeterminate or indefinitely extensible. They claim that for any proposition P judged metaphysically necessary, one can always introduce an alternative notion of necessity under which P is possible. This leads to a form of modal pluralism, akin to logical or set-theoretic pluralism. Just as it makes no sense to seek the “real” axioms of set theory, new deflationists argue that searching for the definitive interpretation of “could have been” is misguided. In this talk, I will evaluate this novel deflationist stance, outlining the different strategies it employs. Ultimately, however, I will defend a traditional monist approach to metaphysical modality. By critically examining the indeterminacy strategy that underpins modal pluralism, I will highlight its weaknesses and argue that a unified, monist view remains a viable and preferable alternative.