Wutausbrüche können bekanntlich destruktiv sein und negative Folgen für die Beteiligten und ihre Beziehung haben. Zunehmend rückt jedoch auch das konstruktive Potenzial der Wut in den Fokus philosophischen Interesses. Beispielsweise werden der Wut wertvolle evaluative, kommunikative und motivationale Funktionen zugeschrieben. Dies wirft die Frage auf, unter welchen Voraussetzungen Wut dieses Potenzial realisieren kann. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage fokussiere ich mich auf die Adressat*innen der Wut und untersuche ihre Verantwortung für das Gelingen oder Scheitern der durch den Wutausbruch initiierten Kommunikation. Ich entwickle das Konzept der anger literacy, um zu zeigen, wie eine Analyse der expressiven, assertiven und direktiven Kraft der Wut die Adressat*innen zu einer angemessenen Aufnahme der Wut befähigen kann. Dazu gehe ich in vier Schritten vor: Erstens unterscheide ich die expressive, die assertive und die direktive Kraft der Wut; zweitens erläutere ich den Begriff der Aufnahme der Wut; auf dieser begrifflichen Grundlage entfalte ich drittens das Konzept der anger literacy und erläutere, inwiefern es hilfreich ist, um die Verantwortung der Adressat*innen für das Gelingen der Kommunikation besser zu verstehen; abschließend diskutiere ich zwei mögliche Einwände.

This paper discusses the moral specificity of sexual encounters and the consequences this has for the moral magic of consent in the sexual realm. In general, the philosophical debate on consent treats sexual encounters as any other encounter whose moral status depends on consent. On this understanding, if everyone involved (validly) consents to the sexual encounter in question, then at least no one is wronged by it. Otherwise, it is a sexual violation. The non-consenting party is wronged because it is a violation of their rights. I will argue that the conclusion to analogy does not work, and that sexual encounters do indeed have special moral properties compared to other encounters whose moral status depends on consent. I will argue this along the lines of intimacy, vulnerability and embodiment. Intimacy and vulnerability entail specific duties for persons sharing the intimate or vulnerable encounter/relationship, and embodiment makes it impossible to distinguish between rights-holders and rights-objects. Taken together, these three features make sexual encounters insufficiently comparable to other encounters whose moral status depends on consent. I will conclude that consequently the moral magic of consent works differently when it comes to sexual encounters.

In my talk, I argue against Joshi’s and McKenna’s claim that, in conversational exchanges which aim at the truth, we have a duty to listen and in favor of our (somewhat constrained) liberty to listen. In section 1, I present Joshi’s and McKenna’s arguments for a duty to listen which highlight the importance of our shared epistemic resources and our duty to do our fair share in maintaining them. In section 2, I point out an important aspect of listening Joshi and McKenna ignore which is its inherent invasiveness and the danger that this constitutes. The fact that we cannot unhear what people tell us and that we cannot keep it from affecting us speaks in favor of granting us the liberty to decide for ourselves when to listen, or so I contend. In section 3, I introduce some constraints on our liberty to listen which, contrary to what Joshi and McKenna argue, stem from moral commitments rather than from epistemic values. I end by discussing two objections.

This paper critically examines Miranda Fricker's virtue-ethical approach to addressing testimonial injustice, acknowledging its limitations and proposing a novel perspective. We analyze two main criticisms of Fricker's account: the impracticality of acquiring individual virtues due to implicit biases and meta-blindness, and the need for collective responses to address socially rooted epistemic injustices. While recognizing these critiques, we argue that individual efforts can still significantly impact unjust credibility deficits in certain contexts. To this end, we introduce the concept of "speaker virtues" to complement Fricker's focus on hearer virtues, and argue, that this extended framework can empower victims and restores their agency as knowers. Drawing on recognition theory, we demonstrate how victims' engagement in a "struggle for recognition of credibility" can resolve specific instances of epistemic injustice and contribute to broader social change. The paper addresses potential objections, particularly concerns about placing burdens on victims, and concludes by highlighting the advantages of this integrated approach in providing practical strategies for addressing epistemic injustice in various contexts.