Conference Agenda

Institutional facts (facts constituted by the collective recognition of their existence) appear to be ontologically peculiar, and a realist perspective on them appears to encounter certain problems. One issue is the possibility of inconsistencies, which may occur when inconsistent states of affairs are collectively recognized.

In a recent article, Richard Corry proposes a solution to this problem. His suggestion is that institutional facts do not exist absolutely but are ontologically relative. According to his proposal, the collective recognition that p through G does not entail the straightforward occurrence of p; rather, it results in the occurrence of p-relative-to-G.

In our presentation, we aim to show, first, that Corry’s account faces significant problems: (a) it is ontologically revisionary, (b) its development appears epistemically ad hoc, and (c) its extension is materially inadequate, if we trust general intuitions.

Secondly, there seems to be an inherent dilemma in the attempt to avoid the inconsistency problem by adopting relativist ontological assumptions, as proposed by Corry. It seems that, quite generally, an account either fails to capture the institutional facts as we conceive of them adequately, or it succumbs to the inconsistency problem.

Ongoing processes require a metaphysical conception of time according to which the world is existentially dynamic. Within the framework of the growing block theory of time, a crucial question emerges concerning the precise nature of becoming in a growing block universe: What exactly happens at the edge of becoming? Does a process constitute an expanding whole – complete yet growing – or is a dynamic processual entity inherently incomplete due to open-endedness? In this talk we want to discuss whether what is situated at the edge of becoming is not yet a temporal part of the (therefore open-ended) process, but rather transforms into its temporal part immediately afterwards. Then, the process is either still ongoing or it has gone on. Through this interpretation, of what dynamic processes are/do at the edge of becoming, open-endedness may not require or constitute an incompleteness of the growing block universe.

My presentation is a contribution to contemporary analytic metaphysics of time and its connection to processualism, i.e., the thesis that processes are fundamental. The discussion of Zeno's arrow paradox has, since Aristotle, been understood to pertain to the mereological structure of time, namely whether it is constituted by points (atomism) or extended intervals (synechism).

Yet, following Whitehead's process philosophy, one should distinguish between the continuity of time and the continuity of becoming. On a processual understanding, Zeno's paradox can be resolved if one questions the premise that processes, in particular the process of becoming, are continuous. It is the discontinuity of becoming that dissolves the troubles posed by Zeno's arrow. Surprisingly, however, the time that is brought about by becoming is continuous.

Such a solution critically rests on the idea that processes, in particular the process of becoming, are more fundamental than time. In light of recent developments in the metaphysics of science and particularly the fundamentality or emergent nature of spacetime, I aim to reevaluate the processual answer and discuss its implications.

This talk examines the divide between events and processes, questioning whether a deep ontological distinction is necessary. Dualists argue that events are static, closed, and perduring, while processes are dynamic, ongoing, and enduring, drawing on aspectual expressions like perfectivity and telicity. I challenge this framework and propose a unified, monistic account that explains the differences without positing distinct ontological categories.

Central to my proposal is a slot-structured mereological framework, where occurrences are four-dimensional individuals composed of instantaneous states or temporal stages. I introduce a distinction in how occurrences realize their essential kind, which models the above mentioned expressions. This structural approach preserves the explanatory power of dualism without requiring fundamentally different ontological categories.

Through this distinction, I show that occurrences can accommodate change and persistence within a perdurantist framework, challenging the dualist claim that only enduring entities can change. I also address the problem of interruption, arguing that interrupted events are better understood as unfulfilled attempts at realization, while occurrences that realize their kind continuously are never incomplete—they simply end. My approach offers a parsimonious framework to unify telicity, persistence, and change.

A perdurant extends through time in virtue of having temporal parts, so it does not directly instantiate any of its temporary properties. If my cold mug was hot, its later temporal parts directly instantiate cooler temperatures, and its earlier temporal parts directly instantiate hotter ones. However construed as a temporally extended whole, the mug only derivatively instantiates heat and coldness, in virtue of its parts doing so. In fact, the mug doesn’t have a temperature at all - its parts do, but the mug itself doesn’t. I’ll call this the perdurantist’s problem of temporary properties.

I argue that Parsons (2000) inadvertently supplies the perdurantist with the tools they need to solve this problem when he posits ‘distributional properties’ which are instantiated by objects over a spatial region or interval of time. If we select the entire pattern of a certain kind of temporary property an event instantiates over its lifetime, then we can say that the whole event does indeed directly instantiate those of its properties that change, in virtue of instantiating this special kind of property.

Martin Pickup (2023) has recently proposed a novel account of change, which he claims to circumvent the well-known concern about B-theoretic accounts that they fail to take change seriously enough: his situationalist account is supposed to accommodate all the desiderata that are thought to be crucial for viewing change as a robust phenomenon. According to the situationalist, what is the case is always relative to situations, but when two situations ‘disagreeing’ about how things are fuse into a larger one, it is metaphysically indeterminate how things are in the larger situation even though they are perfectly determinate in its proper parts—‘zooming out’ makes things fuzzy. The situationalist thus posits ‘worldly’ indeterminacy in any situation in which an object undergoes change—and indeterminacy of such a large scope is likely to alarm even those who are in general sympathetic to the idea. In this paper, I present an alternative, less costly account of the ‘unsettledness’ of large situations, one that views it as a matter of non-uniformity rather than indeterminacy.