Conference Agenda

This paper aims to resolve the recent debate over whether belief is incompatible with inquiry. I first argue that belief that p is either metaphysically or rationally compatible with merely having some doubt about whether p, whereas it is incompatible with being in doubt about it. Being in doubt about whether p is a stronger way of being uncertain about whether p than having some doubt about whether p. One has some doubt about whether p if and only if one is neither certain that p nor certain that not-p. But being in doubt about whether p also requires being in a state that disposes one to be reluctant to take a stand on whether p. I then motivate the idea that inquiry is an activity of resolving doubt and, as such, is sustained by doubt. Since doubt comes in two varieties, inquiry can be sustained by two kinds of doubt. Inquiry into whether p is incompatible with belief that p when it is the inquirer’s being in doubt about whether p that sustains inquiry, However, it is compatible with belief that p when it is the inquirer’s having some doubt about whether p that sustains it.

Is akrasia necessarily irrational? My answer is “yes”. I respond to recent arguments attempting to show that epistemic akrasia is not, which encourages the thought that rationality does not forbid the akratic state. Key to my diagnosis is a generalization of the akratic state beyond beliefs (epistemic akrasia) and intentions to act (practical akrasia) to a wider class of attitudes: the reason-sensitive attitudes. I contend that a failure to notice this generality has prevented commentators to correctly identify the akratic state and invited false diagnoses. In this paper, I first argue that a subject may be akratic with regards to any of her reason-sensitive attitudes, which include for instance motivated desires. Second, I show that the akratic state so understood reduces to believing a contradiction, which is necessarily irrational.

In my talk, I will discuss the recently presented claim by Tilton and Toole that dominant knowers can and should hold marginalized standpoints. While their arguments are mostly convincing, I will show that some problems arise with this view that have not been discussed in standpoint epistemology. For instance, standpoint epistemologists have conceived the method for achieving a standpoint (consciousness-raising) as exclusionary to dominant knowers. I will argue that we should understand consciousness-raising as a process of epistemic cooperation. Then, I will provide some epistemic norms for such cooperation between marginalized and dominant knowers for the latter to achieve standpoints. To do so, I will also discuss a joint paper by Tilton and Toole in which they respond to Taiwo’s critique on deference. Contrary to them, I will argue that for dominant knowers to achieve standpoints, they must defer to epistemically superior marginalized knowers to access relevant evidence and epistemic virtues and behaviours. I will conclude with some words of caution for dominant knowers on how not to dominate marginalized knowers but help to further (epistemic) justice for them.

Feminist epistemologists have long observed that otherwise disadvantaged social positions sometimes come with epistemic benefits. Although such benefits imply comparative deficits on the part of those occupying more advantaged social positions, the distinctive deficits on the part of otherwise privileged persons remain underexamined. This paper focuses on certain epistemic deficits suffered by those occupying positions that grant coercive power. I argue that those occupying such positions are systematically disadvantaged due to this power. In short, coercive power functions—or, at least, can function—to bias the flow of information toward the agent possessing this power.

Such biasing can cause at least three sorts of epistemic challenges for those in positions of coercive power. First, such agents may be fed information intended to please them, rather than to inform them, and may consequently be misinformed. Second, unwelcome information may be withheld from such agents, and thus such agents may be uninformed. Finally, even if agents in positions of coercive power are not misinformed or uninformed, the mere plausible threat that the information they receive is subject to such bias may be enough to compromise the warrant for their beliefs.

Recent debates have characterized suspension of judgment in various ways: as the mere absence of belief and disbelief, as a higher-order belief about one’s lack of commitment, or as a distinct cognitive attitude governed by its own norms. Despite these differing perspectives, there is broad agreement on its linguistic properties: suspension is a question-directed attitude, naturally expressed with interrogative complements. We contribute to the debate with a novel distinction between what we may call standard suspension—e.g. where one does not know whether a proposition is true or false—and radical suspension—e.g. where one is unsure whether the proposition is even on topic to the question under discussion. We discuss the philosophical relevance of the distinction, its problems and possible consequences. Then, to formally capture these distinctions, we propose a game-theoretic semantic framework based on Bochvar’s three-valued logic, where the third value (b) represents an off-topic status. The model incorporates two sub-games: a cooperative sub-game determining topic relevance and a competitive sub-game assessing truth value. In the final part of the talk, we explore the normative profile of radical suspension and how it sets itself apart from other forms of suspension.