Conference Agenda

In the existing literature, the concepts of ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ are built upon a central assumption: trust and trustworthiness are intimately linked because trust is agent-directed. The two concepts are reciprocal: all else being equal, an agent should trust the trustworthy agent. Most accounts assess trust and trustworthiness based on a normative requirement, treating them as two sides of the same coin. In contrast to these views, my account begins with the observation that trust and trustworthiness can come apart, both on the descriptive level and on the normative level. Descriptively, agents can and do sometimes trust untrustworthy agents or fail to trust a trustworthy agent. Normatively, we should sometimes trust untrustworthy agents. due to the ‘feedback-loop’ of trust, where trust encourages trustworthiness. Conversely, we should sometimes not trust otherwise trustworthy agents because trustworthiness is often domain- (or situation) specific.

I propose that we first understand trust and trustworthiness descriptively, as distinct phenomena. By developing an accurate descriptive account based on recent findings in psychology, I aim to provide a novel, empirically grounded metaphysical view. Once both descriptive and metaphysical accounts are established, we can then address the normative question of when an agent should trust another.

The epistemology of testimony is a central pillar of social epistemology.

It is, however, analyzed primarily from the point of view of the justification of the beliefs an audience learns from testimonial reports.

This leaves out important dynamics, in part because the audience is not actually limited to an epistemic interest in the proposition reported on by the speaker in a given testimonial interaction.

Hence, we introduce a game-theoretic representation of testimony to recover a wider range of interests.

Using the model, we analyze a type of epistemic exploitation, a kind of epistemic injustice which occurs in testimonial exchanges.

It is widely agreed that we can and should defer to experts in fields such as the natural sciences. The case is different for morality. Here, many oppose of deference on the grounds that if we defer, we cannot gain knowledge, or fall short of showing an appropriate epistemic or affectional response. In my opinion, however, this is based on a misconception of moral testimony as simple or single-sentence testimony and can be refuted if one conceives of it as narrative testimony – which makes sense because those who speak about morality often have (personal) moral stories to tell.

Some epistemologists argue for the claim that we can wrong others by what we believe about them. In this paper, we shall argue that if we believe in the notion of doxastic wronging, then we should also be open to the possibility of zetetic wronging, i.e. the possibility to wrong others by having an inquisitive attitude about them, irrespective of any subsequent action. First, we shall show that intuitions from cases, as well as the apology argument, provide prima facie support for the concept of zetetic wronging. By parity of reasoning, if these arguments support doxastic wronging, they should likewise support zetetic wronging. Second, we shall explain how inquisitive attitudes can wrong. We shall argue that inquisitive attitudes toward a question Q can be wrongful because of the kind of attitude they are: (i) they are incompatible with holding an outright belief about the answer to Q, (ii) they are goal-directed attitudes and come with satisfaction conditions, (iii) they are responsive to reasons. Finally, we shall argue that zetetic wronging is best thought of as an alternative to doxastic wronging as it can explain the wrong of paradigmatic cases, as well as additional wrongs that doxastic wronging cannot address.

Dilemmic cases in epistemology have attracted a lot of attention recently. In this paper, we suggest a novel approach of how to handle dilemmic cases in epistemology. We will argue that if we adopt an agent-centered view of evidence and reasons, the cases that allegedly give rise to epistemic dilemmas will fail to qualify as genuinely dilemmic.

When we learn that someone holds irrational beliefs, we often respond by reducing our epistemic trust in them: regarding the topic in question, we are less inclined to believe them, less confident in their abilities to form true beliefs, and less willing to partner with them in inquiry. In my talk, I will propose a novel account of epistemic trust reductions. The recently popular relationship-modification account of epistemic blame (RMA) will serve as a foil for this project. RMA says that epistemically blaming others for their epistemic failings involves modifying our epistemic relationships with them, paradigmatically via a reduction of epistemic trust. RMA has faced two challenges, which I will show result from a mistaken view about epistemic trust reductions. On my account, epistemic trust reductions play an essential role in governing the division of epistemic labor. By drawing on resources from legal theory, I will more specifically argue that trust reductions bear all the hallmarks of so-called non-punitive measures, which exclusively serve preventative collective purposes. The resulting account of epistemic trust reductions as non-punitive epistemic measures (NoPEM) explains when and why it is appropriate to reduce epistemic trust and shows where RMA goes wrong.