Conference Agenda

Despite intense debates on particular philosophical methods, such as conceptual analysis, the foundational question “What is a method?” remains surprisingly underexplored. This may be due to Russell’s dictum that “Nothing of value can be said on method except through examples,” which is, however, at odds with philosophers’ treatment of other key topics, like knowledge. This talk challenges Russell’s dictum constructively with a general account of methods as monotelicly coordinated generalized impersonal plans. The account crucially draws on observations about everyday methods, e.g., that methods (1) have constitutive goals, (2) are sketchy in practically irresolvable ways, (3) depend on contextual factors, and (4) exhibit goal unclarity. The account is supplemented with accounts of method-adoption and method-application. Roughly, adopting a method consists in personalizing its impersonal plan, and applying a method in realizing its generalized plan by a contextually particularized plan. Inter alia, the account enables a more systematic examination of method-evaluation in terms of, e.g., reliability and efficiency, goal-appropriateness and goal-clarity, and contextual adequacy. The account also sheds light on particular methods, such as philosophical argumentation or reflective equilibrium, and important methodological controversies, like the debate about “the scientific method”, which is plagued by a rigid and unrealistic understanding of methods.

The philosophical program of conceptual engineering is habitually presented as marking a methodological shift in philosophy. But for all the recent interest in methodology, there is little debate on what philosophical methodology amounts to, or how philosophical programs might impact it. Drawing on the idea that we can capture impact on methodology (uncountable) by tracing impact on methodologies (count noun), we develop a proposal as to how one may track methodological impact, and we apply it to conceptual engineering. First, we set off philosophical methodology against philosophical methodologies. Second, we engineer a simple model of philosophical methodologies as types of minimal philosophical projects, which we understand as triples <A,M,C> combining a proximal philosophical aim A, a philosophical method M, and a philosophical concern C. Finally, we use our model to argue that conceptual engineering is apt to impact philosophical methodology in three ways – (1) by popularizing a characteristic engineering methodology combining aims A, methods M, and concerns C into a generic type of philosophical project, (2) by popularizing the characteristic practical concern of improving the world by ameliorating language, and (3) by bringing conventional philosophers to shift their proximal aims to engineering aims, and their methods to engineering methods.

We should typologise the thought experiments we employ as tests for theories, i.e., formulate abstract case-types of which our specific thought experiments are case-tokens: When proposing a case-type, we make a hypothesis about which of the case’s structural features guided our intuitive evaluation. If we present both a thought experiment and our suggestion what case-type we think it’s a token of, we open up means for assessing whether our intuition about the case should have evidential weight in the process of theory-testing. An intuition about a thought experiment should only have evidential weight if it is directly replicable, i.e., if an exact repetition of the experiment yields the same result. But even if this is confirmed, we cannot be sure the intuition is accurate. The thought experiment might be deceptively formulated, misleading people’s intuitions. We should therefore use the hypothesised case-type as a blueprint for formulating additional case-tokens, and then test whether these evoke the same intuition. If they do, we have a conceptual replication, lending some support for using our intuitions about tokens of this case-type as evidence. If they don’t, further research is needed: Either our original thought experiment is deceptively formulated or our hypothesised case-type is wrong.

The orthodox view holds that verdicts about hypothetical cases in thought experiments are based on intuitions. Cappelen, Deutsch, and more recently Horvath (collectively CDH) challenge this view, arguing instead that such verdicts are based on arguments. CDH support their view by citing textual evidence from contemporary thought experiments. This paper raises two objections to the argument view, specifically regarding Gettier's thought experiments. First, the linguistic reasoning indicators in Gettier's text are insufficient to substantiate the argument view. Reasoning may facilitate understanding without serving as evidence, leaving room for intuitive justification. Second, the argument view fails to account for the compelling epistemic force of Gettier's case, a point I will substantiate through various arguments.

There are few texts addressing the issue of the distinction between true philosophy and ‘false’, ‘bogus’ or ‘pseudo-philosophy’. All the approaches so far share a similar structure – pseudo-philosophy is defined in terms of certain relation to the standards of true philosophy. The difference between these approaches lies only in the different definition of this relationship. This shared structure of the previous theories of pseudo-philosophy results in an impasse. Firstly, it entangles the issue in the problem of uninformativeness, since there is no agreement on the content of the ‘standards of true philosophy’. Secondly, it fails to grasp the difference between pseudo-philosophy and ‘bad’ philosophy, i.e. low-quality deliberation. In my talk, I will review previous approaches and describe the problems mentioned above. I will then present my own attempt to overcome the impasse in considering pseudo-philosophy. I shall call it ‘social metaphilosophy’, i.e. an approach to the discipline that shifts the focus from philosophical rules, values and essential properties to the socio-institutional aspects of philosophizing. I will attempt to argue that social metaphilosophy elucidates the notion of pseudo-philosophy better than the traditional ‘individual’ approach.

Wer sich in der Philosophie umsieht, gerät zuweilen ins Staunen. Philosophen scheinen sich nur über wenige Thesen einig zu sein; vielmehr scheint die Kontroverse der Normalfall. Können wir vor diesem Hintergrund guten Gewissens von „Fortschritt“ in der Philosophie sprechen?

Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass die Diagnose, die Philosophie erziele keine nennenswerten Fortschritte, während Natur- und Technikwissenschaften rasant voranschritten, fehlgeleitet ist. Dabei werde ich zunächst erörtern, welche Argumente üblicherweise gegen die Existenz philosophischen Fortschritts vorgebracht werden, und in einem nächsten Schritt auf die Frage eingehen, in welchem Verhältnis die Philosophie zu denjenigen Wissenschaften steht, denen nahezu vorbehaltlos Fortschritte zugeschrieben werden. Ich werde drei unterschiedliche Konzeptionen philosophischen Fortschritts diskutieren: i) die Elimination als falsch erwiesener Positionen oder logisch-begrifflicher Widersprüche, ii) die Präzisierung philosophischer Probleme und ihrer Lösungsvorschläge, sowie iii) die Aktualisierung philosophischer Konzepte und Positionen angesichts neuer Erkenntnisse anderer Wissenschaften oder soziokultureller Veränderungen. Ich werde schließlich die Position einnehmen, dass die Philosophie als Teil eines methodisch differenzierten Wissenschaftsgefüges anzusehen ist, dessen einzelne Disziplinen durch Familienähnlichkeiten zusammengehalten werden, und den eigenen Anspruch auf Erkenntnisfortschritt und Wahrheitsermittlung keineswegs aufgeben muss.