Perspectival realism (PR) emerged as a pluralist defense of scientific realism (Giere 2006, Mitchell 2009, Massimi 2022). PR seeks to integrate scientific pluralism with a commitment to scientific realism, presenting a challenge: how can the proposed pluralism be reconciled with scientific realism as a stable middle ground?

This talk aims to address this challenge by drawing inspiration from Barry Loewer’s Package Deal Account (PDA) (cf. Loewer 2024; Author 2023 for a similar proposal). Two key interpretations of PDA are explored: PDA Pluralism and PDA Realism. PDA Pluralism posits that the history of science reveals various "packages," such as Newtonian, Lagrangian, and relativistic frameworks. PDA Realism, on the other hand, emphasizes the structure of the world may support multiple package deals. However, there is a fact of the matter that one does not know which properties are metaphysically instantiated

Together, PDA Pluralism and PDA Realism give rise to a hybrid position called Perspectival PDA, which identifies a pattern of knowledge preservation—formulated as laws—across historical package deals. The Perspectival PDA thus offers a stable middle ground, harmonizing the pluralist and realist commitments within a coherent and unified framework.

The Better Best System Account (BBSA) of laws of nature is a descendant of Lewis's Best System Account (BSA). However, the BBSA divorces with the notion of natural properties and instead features a relative freedom on the selection of the basic set of properties. But this move evades an important issue regarding the selected properties: their relationship to the world. In this paper, I want to assert, with [schrenk 2023] that the BBSA proponents should give an account of the semantic theories that could coincide with their claims.

However, I will argue, against Schrenk, in favour of a certain understanding of Semantic Externalism (SE) supported by Putnam. To support this claim, I will answer the first main objection given by Schrenk against SE to show it can be be a genuine option for the contemporary humean accounts of laws. SE can still, in a rightful way, provide a form of freedom in the choice of predicates / properties required for the pluralistic approach of the BBSA.

This paper challenges the common view that scientific theory confirmation must be contrastive (requiring examination of rival theories). Drawing on scientific practice, it argues that theories can be confirmed by evidence alone when that evidence is exceptionally strong. The argument is supported by three case studies: (1) Perrin's work on atomism, where he largely ignored rival theories; (2) mod-ern biology textbooks' presentation of evolution, which emphasizes evidence quality rather than rival theories; and (3) scientists' current treatment of well-established theories like atomism as uncontested facts. The paper examines four possible explanations for (3) – scientists' implicit justification of these theories – arguing that it stems from their immersion in overwhelming evidence with strong con-firmatory features, rather than from considering rival theories or historical chains of testimony.

A frequently invoked principle for theory appraisal in the sciences and humanities (including, especially, philosophy) are the so-called ‘virtues of a good theory’, such as simplicity, predictive power, and coherence with well-established theories. It is commonly held, though, that a clear understanding of the virtues is still lacking. An approach that has not yet been sufficiently appreciated as an answer to this problem has been pursued by Paul Thagard under the label ‘coherence-based inference’. As a specific implementation of this approach, Thagard’s ‘Theory of Explanatory Coherence’ (TEC) operationalizes the theoretical virtues and their interplay through formal ‘coherence principles’. However, TEC faces several challenges: (1) It is ambiguous with regard to the case of comparing more than two competing theories. (2) A preference for simpler (i.e., less ad hoc) explanations is not covered sufficiently in the coherence principles laid down within TEC. (3) A preference for more consilient (or ‘unified’) explanations is not sufficiently operationalized in the coherence principles. I propose solutions to challenges (1)-(3) and argue, on basis of a review of the theoretical virtues discussed in the literature, that the revised version of TEC can afford an illuminating model of theory appraisal, unifying the variety of virtues.

This paper examines the discourse surrounding the role of pluralism within the heterodox school of ecological economics. It contributes to the extensive literature on scientific pluralism within general philosophy of science by integrating two major accounts of pluralism. The argument will be presented that there is sufficient common ground between Hasok Chang’s interactive and Helen Longino’s critical pluralism to extend Chang’s three original modes of interaction with a fourth mode of critical interaction. This modified account of interactive pluralism not only addresses the pluralism question internal to ecological economics but also offers a novel approach to the wider discourse on a purported lack of plurality in contemporary economics. There is, in fact, substantial plurality, which manifests in numerous different schools of thought. The critical issue, nonetheless, lies in the lack of interaction among these schools along the lines of the four proposed modes of interaction.

First it is shown that post-intervention probabilities can be understood as conditional probabilities whose conditions are sufficiently informative: they specify not merely that something is true but that it is made true. Then a few consequences of philosophical relevance are pointed out.