Conference Agenda

Public and private organizations increasingly deploy AI-systems for the autonomous execution of tasks and decisions. Given these systems’ inherent complexity, even the strictest safety measures cannot fully prevent adverse outcomes, subjecting individuals to serious harm. This raises the following question: Who ought to take responsibility for AI-related harm, when it is not the direct result of human fault? Drawing on the philosophy of tort law, I argue that AI-deployers have a strict moral duty to take responsibility for harmful outcomes, even if the deployment of the harm-imposing AI is morally permissible. In contrast to traditional responsibility accounts based on blameworthiness, the proposed account of strict responsibility is not predicated on a prior duty violation but on a proactive duty to provide redress in case individuals are harmed. It is a relational duty that arises from what I call the “accidental relationship”, which highlights the intrinsic connection between AI-deployers and the harmed individuals, and in which taking responsibility is an expression of recognizing the harmed individual as moral equal.

„Niemand darf einem Tier ohne vernünftigen Grund Schmerzen, Leiden oder Schäden zufügen“, heißt es in §1 TierSchG. Der "vernünftige Grund“ ist ein Schlüsselbegriff des vom deutschen Tierschutzgesetz verfolgten „ethischen Tierschutzes“, bezieht er sich doch auf die Rechtfertigung dafür, einem allgemeinen Nichtschädigungsgebot gegenüber Tieren zuwiderzuhandeln. Der Ethik ist für die Interpretation dieses unbestimmten Rechtsbegriffs mitunter die Rolle einer Rationalisierungsinstanz zugewiesen worden. In diesem Vortrag soll eine ethische Kritik an der Interpretation des vernünftigen Grundes als Ausprägung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes entwickelt werden. Die Suche nach einem vernünftigen Grund als einem auf einer Güterabwägung basierenden Rechtfertigungsgrund vernachlässigt eine für die ethische Rechtfertigung Tiere schädigender Handlungen relevante Frage, nämlich die nach der Selektion des Schadensnehmers. Ein „ethisches“ Tierschutzgesetz müsste Rechtfertigungen für die Schädigung je spezifischer Individuen – und beispielsweise nicht als beliebige Vertreter ihrer Spezies – verlangen. Hinter dieser Überlegung steht die allgemeinere Frage danach, unter welchen Umständen ein Individuum (in der Rolle des moral patient) durch die Interessen eines moralischen Akteurs überhaupt zu einem Beteiligten einer Problemsituation gemacht werden kann. Der Vortrag erläutert die Relevanz eines modifizierten Zuständigkeitskriteriums für die Anerkennung von moral patients als Situationsbeteiligte und konkretisiert die sich daraus ergebende Kritik an der Konzeption des vernünftigen Grundes mit Blick auf die Tierversuchsdebatte.

Do judges have an obligation to apply the law of the legal system to which their courts belong? It can seem obvious that they do. But even the qualified proposition that judges in a legitimate legal system, i.e. one whose laws enjoy legitimate authority, have an obligation to apply the laws of that system is in fact far from simple to justify. The goal of this paper is to flesh out in some detail what such an obligation consists in – and thus what it is that one is trying to justify –, and to argue for a positive proposal as to how it could be justified. The proposal, which grounds judicial obligation on the value of the rule of law, has implications for our understanding of the nature of political legitimacy: that is, for our understanding of what is involved in establishing that some legally constituted political institution (or conglomerate of political institutions, such as those of a modern territorial state) is justified in its activities (including but not limited to coercive activities) and claims (including but not limited to the claim to possessing practical authority).

We probabilify the scenario approach to legal proof. The scenario approach searches for the scenario that strikes the best balance in explaining the available evidence, in fitting to general background beliefs, and in its degree of internal coherence. Our account provides a unified measure of the three dimensions in terms of probabilities, and so is proof that the scenario approach can be probabilified. Indeed, our account can be summarized by a version of Bayes Theorem: the most likely scenario in light of the evidence is the best. We thereby provide a Bayesian justification for the scenario approach.

In this talk I want to answer the question which criteria a scientific claim has to fulfill in order to be considered as acceptable to public reason in the Rawlsian sense. Belloio argues that a scientific claim is acceptable to public reason if it is a consensus among experts and is reached via a publicly accepted method. However, I argue that in the debate around what scientific claims should be acceptable to public reason the role of non-epistemic values is overlooked. For a statement to be acceptable to public reason it is not only important for it to be a consensus among experts and reached via a publicly accepted method but also that this consensus is based on a variety of non-epistemic values which represent the non-epistemic values held by the public to some extent. This is the case as different non-epistemic values can lead to different scientific results. So, a citizen who reasonably disagrees with the non-epistemic values which underlie a scientific consensus cannot be reasonably expected to accept this consensus as justification for coercion over her. Therefore it is important for a scientific consensus to be acceptable to public reason to rely on a variety of non-epistemic values.