On the classical conception of excuses, an agent is fully excused for φing in circumstances C on account of x iff φing was not blameworthy, yet still all-things-considered wrong. Here, I field a novel argument against this view. This argument takes its cue from the possibility of agents overcoming the obstacles on account of which they count as fully excused. As I argue, defenders of the classical conception face a dilemma in accounting for the surmountability of x. Either overcoming x and not-φing is impossible, in which case considerations of Ought Implies Can yield that φing in C is not wrong. Or overcoming x and not-φing is possible and supererogatory, in which case conceptual features of supererogation again guarantee that φing in C is not wrong. I then sketch an alternative view holding that excuses are a special agent-centred class of Dancy-style disablers. Specifically, these are factors that disable the reason-giving force of considerations for agents because these agents cannot be expected to φ in S. I flesh out and defend this view, showing how it allows us to retain crucial conceptual features of excuses without committing us to the problematic idea that excuses can remove blameworthiness without affecting permissibility.

What determines the moral requirements that we have? According to the widely held practical reasons view, what we are morally required to do is determined by practical reasons – reasons for performing or refraining from actions. I argue that proponents of the practical reasons view face a dilemma if they attempt to make room for supererogation by appealing to the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In most cases where actions are judged to be supererogatory, they must either regard them as morally required or as rationally objectionable. If the moral reasons for these so-called supererogatory actions are stronger, they must regard them as morally required; if the non-moral reasons are stronger, they must regard them as rationally objectionable. Both alternatives are undesirable, and the occasions on which neither is the case are rare. The distinction between moral and non-moral reasons does not help us out of this dilemma; rather, it leads us into it. For the practical reasons view to be defensible, it needs to be adapted so that it is no longer vulnerable to the dilemma. This applies, for example, to de Kenessey’s (2023) view, which, in the form in which it is presented, seems untenable.

This paper aims to contribute to the deontic buck-passing project, that is, the project of analysing deontic properties and concepts in terms of normative reasons. I focus on the question of whether the project of analysing the deontic notion of a claim-right in terms of reasons is neutral with respect to other questions about rights. I argue, specifically, that buck-passers about rights must accept that rights are contributory rather than absolute notions, that their content is fully general rather than specified with exceptive clauses, and that they cannot be fully neutral among different theories of rights. First, I argue that since moral reasons could not be in principle indefeasible, insofar as rights are grounded in reasons, they cannot be indefeasible or absolute. Second, I argue that since specificationism about rights entails absolutism and buck-passers must reject absolutism, they must also reject specificationism. Finally, I argue that since rights correlate to directed duties, the notion of directedness must also be located at the level of reasons. However, one cannot make sense of this notion at the level of reasons if one appeals to theories such as the will theory. Hence, insofar as buck-passers must reject the will theory.

This paper defends a novel version of explanationism about normative reasons:

Virtue-Explanationism (VE): For R to be a normative reason for A to Q in situation S is for R to be a reason why A would Q in S, if A were virtuous.

The paper starts by motivating VE with a Kantian insight about the relationship between normative guidance and ideal agency. It then argues that VE, when combined with a plausible Davidsonian analysis of explanatory reasons, can elegantly account for both the weight and directionality of normative reasons, and the striking metaphysical similarities between normative reasons and causes. The paper closes by defending VE against charges of extensional inadequacy and circularity.

Explanationism holds that facts involving normative reasons reduce to facts involving the explanation of deontic properties. This paper argues that explanationism fails to account for the link between normative reasons for action and rational motivation, i.e., why agents act for those reasons. Two versions of the challenge are developed, drawing on two internalist principles--a metaphysical and an agent-centered one.

The metaphysical principle suggests that normative phenomena directly guide rational agents. However, if explanationism takes the reasons relation to be merely descriptive, then only deontic status properties qualify as genuinely normative. These properties might direct agents to do the right action, but they do not explain why agents act for certain reasons.

The agent-centered principle holds that rational agents respond to their recognition of a fact as a normative reason. Yet it remains unclear why agents should be motivated simply by the grounds of deontic properties. An appeal to the idea that agents base their actions on evidence for an action’s rightness still does not explain how such evidence itself becomes a motivating reason. Consequently, a competing view like reasons-primitivism--which treats normative reasons as irreducible--may better capture the connection between reasons and rational motivation.

According to holism about reasons, reasons are variant: whether a given fact is a reason for, a reason against or neither varies across situations. One argument against this view is the thick reasons argument: the argument that, since (1) thick reasons (e.g. the fact [Kim’s action is dishonest]) are invariant and since (2) they are indicative of what reasons are paradigmatically like, it follows that reasons are paradigmatically invariant. There are two strategies for defending reasons holism against this argument. The first strategy is to reject premise (1) and argue that thick reasons are variant. The second strategy is to reject premise (2) and argue that, insofar as thick reasons are invariant, they are outliers, not paradigms of reasonhood. In this paper, I first criticize these two strategies, before suggesting an alternative. Specifically, I suggest that, instead of attacking the premises of the thick reasons argument, reasons holists should reject its main presupposition: that thick facts are reasons. Thick facts, I argue, should be viewed as facts about reasons (e.g. the fact [Kim’s action is dishonest] is the fact [[Kim’s action is a believed-false statement] makes Kim’s action pro tanto wrong]). I close by responding to two objections.