Catherine Elgin famously argued that scientific representations (e.g. models, diagrams) are ‘felicitous falsehoods’, insofar as they diverge from ‘truth’ by simplifying or idealizing their target system but this divergence is exactly what makes them epistemically felicitous since it facilitates understanding (cf. 2017, 1). Elgin thus defines the ‘felicitousness’ of scientific representations solely in epistemic terms which excludes the possibility that they might engender understanding but nevertheless be ‘infelicitous’ due to ethical-political reasons, such as some of Marie and Otto Neurath’s Isotypes which e.g. reveal a racist aesthetics by representing East Asians with yellow-coloured figures and using similar visual stereotypes.

In this talk, I critically discuss Elgin’s conception of scientific representations as ‘felicitous falsehoods’ using the example of the Neurath’s Isotypes and their use of racist visual stereotypes and show that this leads to a ‘dilemma’ since the epistemic success of such representations depends essentially on the use of politically problematic visual stereotypes. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s artwork-essay (1969), I analyze this dilemma in terms of the opportunities and dangers coming along with a ‘collective aesthetic’. Concludingly, I follow Benjamin’s call for a ‘politicization of the aesthetic’, arguing for an account of scientific representations which complements Elgin’s with a political dimension.

We argue that the Harmony Problem in architecture actually consists of two problems that are often conflated in the literature: the Inter-Harmony Problem and the Intra-Harmony Problem. The Inter-Harmony Problem arises when buildings do not harmonize with other buildings, whereas the Intra-Harmony Problem arises when the proper parts of a building do not to harmonize. We argue that both problems demand an explanation in the context of modern architecture. We defend a new explanation of the Inter-Harmony Problem based on the notion of degrees of freedom, and we compare our approach with (i) Silber’s, who blames the celebrity architects’ lust for attention, (ii) Scruton’s, who identifies a lack of grammar in modern architecture, and (iii) de Clercq’s, who exposes a tendency of dehumanization in modern architecture.

Die platonistische Partei hat sich in der werkontologischen Diskussion des letzten Jahrhunderts immer wieder auf Freges Begriff des Objektiv-Nichtwirklichen bezogen. Doch während Freges paradigmatische Kandidaten für Objektiv-Nichtwirklichkeit (Begriffe, Zahlen und Gedanken) als ewig bzw. außerzeitlich gelten, erscheinen Werke als per definitionem geschaffen; sie haben folglich einen Anfang in der Zeit. Wenn aber – wie es von hier aus den Anschein haben kann – Objektiv-Nichtwirklichkeit Außerzeitlichkeit impliziert, dann müsste eine platonistische Werkontologin den prima facie absurden Schluss ziehen, dass auch Werke, so wie Begriffe, Zahlen und Gedanken, in Wahrheit keinen Anfang in der Zeit hätten, und dass sie also durch ihre jeweilige Autorin gar nicht erfunden, sondern lediglich gefunden würden. Ich argumentiere, dass dieser Schluss vorschnell ist: Freges Argument für die Objektiv-Nichtwirklichkeit von Entitäten erzwingt keineswegs eine Außerzeitlichkeit derselben. Frege nennt vielmehr diejenigen Entitäten objektiv-nichtwirklich, die zwar nicht als solche sinnlich wahrnehmbar sind, die aber in unserer diskursiven Praxis immer schon als objektiv vorausgesetzt werden. Ich zeige, dass sich dieses Argument in der Tat auf Werke (als geschaffene Entitäten) übertragen lässt. Damit eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit, dass Werke sowohl objektiv-nichtwirklich als auch erfunden sein können. Der Vortrag untersucht die Konsequenzen dieser Position für die Begriffe von Autorschaft, Erstmanifestation und Werkidentität.

This paper argues that aesthetic emotions—emotions experienced when evaluating art as art—are inherently epistemic emotions, as they enhance cognitive processing and understanding. This claim will be discussed within a framework of Affective Aesthetic Cognitivism that posits that emotional engagement with art is central to fostering cognitive expansion, reflection, and creative insight. I will conduct a Philosophically Guided supplementary Analysis (PGsA) of existing empirical data from published studies, demonstrating that aesthetic emotions in their datasets are correlated to both high ratings of artistic value and cognitive transformations, including moments of insight and shifts in perspective. This paper bridges the gap between philosophical aesthetics and empirical research. It will discuss the embodiment, core affect, and semantic dimension of wonder, and demonstrate that it is a paradigmatic aesthetic emotion that tracks the artistic value of art. 

There seems to be a puzzle, as all the following three sentences appear to be true: (1) Single pictures can be narrative; (2) Sequences of time are an integral part of narratives; (3) Single pictures cannot represent sequences of time. To solve the puzzle one of the sentences is wrong and in need of adaptation. In this paper I argue that that sentence (3) is wrong, and I argue that single pictures can represent sequences of time and therefore can be narrative.

But if pictures can be narrative, how can they be narrative? How is it possible that single pictures, without words, can transport a narrative content? There are three options: (a) the narrative content is depicted, (b) the narrative content is represented, (c) the narrative content is conveyed by (using) pictures in some other way. For sentence (1) to be true, either option (a) or option (b) must be possible. With the help of examples, I show that it is possible to formulate semantic rules that take us from a depicted content to a represented narrative content, and thereby offering an account that provides a solution to the puzzle and the subsequent how-question.