Ongoing debates about the ontology and epistemology of trust – both generally and in the context of epistemic trust in science – often conceptualize trust as reliance supplemented by an additional factor, such as the trustee’s willingness (Hawley, 2014). In the context of science, epistemic trust depends on three conditions: (1) reliance on the trustee’s competence, (2) reliance on their willingness, and (3) acceptance of the trustor’s vulnerability. These conditions highlight the epistemic and normative dimensions of trust, both of which are undermined when scientific findings supporting policy decisions are challenged or denied.

This paper examines key agnotological strategies used to deny scientific findings that underpin political regulations, particularly in epidemiology and climate research. I argue that these strategies not only foster distrust but actively redirect trust toward alternative structures constructed to signal trustworthiness. Rather than viewing science denialism as merely an effort to discredit science (Hansson, 2017), this frames it as a strategic attempt to redirect existing trust in science.

Furthermore, I propose that those influenced by doubt-mongering are not excessive skeptics but individuals placing trust in unreliable sources. Addressing this requires strengthening the socio-epistemic infrastructure to enhance the devision of epistemic labor, alongside measures like inoculation against misinformation.

The assumption that there is such a thing as “THE scientific method” is widespread, both within science and in the public’s understanding of science. It represents a view of science that places hypothesis testing at the center of the scientific enterprise and sees observations as irrevocable benchmarks for evaluating theories.

In my talk, I argue that the prevalence of the ‘myth’ that there is such a thing as ‘THE scientific method’ can foster distrust in science for two reasons: First, it makes science vulnerable to external attacks when research does not conform to these standards. Second, treating hypothesis testing as the gold standard of scientific practice can lead scientists to overlook alternative scientific reasoning strategies, such as mechanistic understanding. When this occurs in situations where urgent answers are required from science, it can further erode public trust in science.

In this talk we use climate tipping points as case study to investigate conditions under which scientists may legitimately communicate deeply uncertain scientific claims to policy-makers and the public. We identify three distinct concerns: the question of appropriate evidential standards for policy purposes; the legitimacy of appealing to deeply uncertain knowledge in policy advice; the problem of how properly to communicate deeply uncertain knowledge. We propose recommendations for addressing each of them: Decisions concerning the appropriateness of evidential standards need to be made communally and transparently; when uncertain knowledge should be communicated ought to be dependent on the needs and vulnerabilities of stakeholders, influencing what kind of knowledge is policy relevant and what science-policy decision framework we should adopt; the framing is key when it comes to inherently and deeply uncertain knowledge and here recent story-line approaches can play an important role.