We hold each other responsible for attitudes in a similar way as we hold each other responsible for actions. We think that we ought to believe in human induced climate change, and we even consider it to be appropriate to criticize others if they fail to believe in it. A malicious desire, like the desire for another’s suffering, can rightly provoke not only disapproval, but also resentment or indignation. An emotion like anger might turn out to be unjustified, and we might owe an apology to the person who was the target of our hostile emotion. And merely intending to become a better person can already be worthy of praise or credit.

Yet how can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? The connections of this question to debates on rationality have not been fully recognized: we get puzzled about mental responsibility only because, unlike mere headaches and other sensations, attitudes are responses to reasons. Some accounts claim that our responsibility for attitudes is only indirect – that we are ultimately responsible only for voluntary actions and omissions that cause and influence our attitudes. However, such views fail to recognize the normativity of reasons for attitudes, among them being epistemic reasons for belief.

This book argues that the normativity of reasons for attitudes, and with it our direct responsibility for attitudes, is revealed in the accountability practices that shape our interpersonal relationships. Drawing on the recent literature about epistemic blame, it develops a hybrid account that acknowledges rationalist and voluntarist faces of mental responsibility.

Programm:

10:00 Geert Keil: Einführung

10:05 Sebastian Schmidt: Vorstellung des Buches

10:20 Kommentar durch Antti Kauppinen

10:40 Kommentar durch Eva Schmidt

11:00 Sebastian Schmidt: Replik

11:15 Allgemeine Diskussion