Conceptual engineering has played a prominent role in recent work in philosophy, and some have even argued that much traditional philosophical work should be understood or rethought in those terms. Here I argue that we need a notion of linguistic function to do work in conceptual engineering. For we need to understand how the relevant parts of language work, and what functions they have served, before we make forward-looking decisions about whether to retain, remove, repair, or revise them. But despite the usefulness of a notion of linguistic function, many philosophers have expressed skepticism against the idea that we can identify the functions of concepts or terms. Here I also respond these strains of skepticism and suggest how to begin to develop a notion of linguistic system function that can avoid these forms of skepticism, building on work in systemic functional linguistics, complemented by a 'concern-based' approach to linguistic functions. Better understanding how parts and aspects of our language function, I will argue, can enable us to make far better-informed decisions in conceptual engineering and can be especially useful in assessing and resolving many old philosophical problems.

Grammatical metaphor is a key resource in the evolution of language's semogenic potential: it allows for new meanings to be made by reconfiguring the relationship between lexicogrammar and semantics. In this talk, I propose a metafunctional perspective on its power. Grammatical metaphor is distinct from other semiotic shifts (such as transcategorisation or conversion) in that it draws on the stratified nature of language and involves a "constant decoupling and recoupling between the semantics and the lexicogrammar" (Halliday 2003: 253). It is therefore intimately tied to metaredundancy (Taverniers 2019), the dynamic mapping across levels that enables languages to stretch their meaning potential in context-sensitive ways.

This power is most visible in knowledge-based and technocratic discourse, where grammatical metaphor scaffolds abstraction, condensation and disciplinarity across ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions. But as Halliday reminds us, "with power comes responsibility" (2003: 269). In the final part of the talk, I explore the ethical and pedagogical implications: who gains access to this powerful resource, and how can it be taught? I argue for a socially engaged view of grammatical metaphor that foregrounds issues of access, appropriation, and linguistic agency in language education.

Halliday, M.A.K. 2003. Linguistics as metaphor. In: Halliday, M.A.K., On Language and Linguistics. Ed. by Jonathan Webster. Continuum. 248–270.

Taverniers, Miriam. 2019. Semantics. In: Thompson, Geoff, Wendy L. Bowcher, Lise Fontaine and Jennifer Yameng Liang (eds.) Cambridge Handbook of Systemic Functional Linguistics. Cambridge UP.

Request, affirm, alert, offer, promise, threaten, declare ... - these are just some of the actions we humans perform when we communicate. A key question in animal communication studies is which sorts of communicative actions non-human animals can perform. In this talk, I will attempt to sketch an answer to this question. To do so, I first give reasons that explain the apparent similarities between humans’ communicative acts, so called "speech acts", and those of nonhuman animals. Second, I explain the main problems with the two dominant approaches to illocutionary acts currently on offer, Gricean intentionalism and Austinian normative conventionalism. Thirdly, I sketch out a new theory of illocutionary acts that is capable of accommodating both human and animal’s communicative interactions. On this theory, each type of illocutionary act is characterised by the functions of the signal and those of the response which constitute a communicative interaction. The final section of the talk discusses some advantages and consequences of the theory.

My aim in this (very much work in progress) paper is to bring the literature on praise into contact with contemporary literature on functions. Theorists have made claims about what praise is and does, attributing various functions to our practice(s) of expressing praise: communicative functions (Macnamara); agency improving functions (Vargas); community building functions (Calhoun); norm affirming functions (Shoemaker and Vargas, myself). But what sense of function do these theorists each have in mind? And how might this help us understand what our practices of expressing praise should do, if they are to be justified? This paper aims to make a start in answering these questions, and so to clarify functional approaches to moral appraisal.

Imagine some beings much like ourselves, but which are unable to dissemble. What exactly would be lost if we were such beings? Why, in other words, have we developed as dissemblers as opposed to non-dissemblers? I will argue that, given some plausible assumptions about our epistemic and psychological limitations, one important thing that would be lost would be our capacity for social repair---or at least much of it. On one plausible understanding of the functions of our capacities, then, the function of deception turns out not to be anything selfish, but rather something like social stability.