Imagination, in its most typical form involves imagery, be it visual, auditory, proprioceptive or associated with some other sensory modality. Further, such imagery can be crucial to the development of novel theories and by that means of scientific discoveries. This raises the questions whether an investigator who lacks phenomenal consciousness (perhaps due to being an aphantasiac, or being an AI), can make a scientific discovery by means of imagination, as well as whether scientific discovery can benefit from unconscious imaginative ideation in a neurotypical human. In this talk, I will offer affirmative answers to both questions. In so doing I shall spell out the idea of unconscious imaginative ideation, and on that basis defend the possibility of imagination driving scientific discovery beyond the scope of phenomenal consciousness.

Recent efforts toward theorising the role of serendipity (that is, accidental or chance-based findings) in scientific discovery encounter an inevitable problem with the data available: most of it is in narrative form, and anecdotal, and thus presents not only case-by-case variability but great potential for rhetorical bias. At least, a positive bias exists, given that instances of missed or failed serendipity are (one assumes) drastically under-represented in the literature, having not led to discovery despite their potential. Accumulating more instances (anecdotes), and nearer to the point of occurrence, in favour of continuing to use apocrypha like the story of Archimedes in the bath, is one way to improve on the theory we can derive from the experience and practice of scientists; to this end, a new series in the Journal of Trial and Error began last year. For this talk, I look to how (or whether) the theory presented by myself and colleagues in this series so far, derived from analysis of empirical cases, takes into account issues of rhetorical justice relevant to the utilization of anecdotes to theorize the structure of scientific discovery.

What marks the moment of scientific discovery? This paper examines how this moment is determined, and the extent to which it involves conventional elements. Although scientific practice often treats discovery as a discrete event, philosophical accounts reveal its conceptual and temporal complexity. I begin with Kuhn’s distinction between that- and what-discoveries, as well as Schindler’s refinements. In order to address the question of when a discovery occurs, I draw on the recent Change-Driver account of scientific discovery by Dürr and Mills, integrating a more nuanced theory of scientific problems. Building on Nickles’ constraint-inclusion model of scientific problems, I argue that the moment of discovery is shaped by the evolving structure of problems and the conventions that guide their resolution. This approach highlights the pragmatic and often negotiated nature of claims to discovery, offering a more adequate account of how discoveries are recognised and situated in time within scientific practice. The account is illustrated through the case of the Higgs boson, where theoretical expectations, empirical data, and institutional decisions jointly shaped when the discovery was declared.