The term imagination refers to a heterogeneous range of mental states and experiences (Kind 2013), yet what unites these under a single conceptual category remains an open question (Nanay 2023). One influential view—what Wiltsher (2019) calls the imitation theory—holds that the essential feature of imagination lies in its capacity to imitate, recreate, or simulate other mental states. This model underpins prominent accounts, from Walton’s (1990) theory of fiction, to Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) notion of re-creative imagination, as well as Peacocke’s (1985) and Dokic and Arcangeli’s (2015) accounts of experiential imagination.

Despite its explanatory value in the philosophy of mind, the imitation model has significant limitations—especially regarding the epistemic role of imagination. It risks reducing imagination’s epistemic power to that of a mere surrogate for perception. In this talk, I argue for rethinking the essential feature of imaginative experience. Rather than imitation, I propose that imagination is best characterized by its re-combinatorial power—its ability to draw on diverse mental states and combine them in novel ways. This shift brings imagination closer to models of linguistic creativity, better captures its diverse manifestations, and, crucially, offers a clearer account of its unique epistemic power.