Conference Agenda
Overview and details of the sessions of this conference. Please select a date or location to show only sessions at that day or location. Please select a single session for detailed view (with abstracts and downloads if available).
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W03.2: Similarity after Carnap - Perspectives from Philosophy and Cognitive Science Location: 23.21 U1.75 In his Aufbau programme, Carnap sought to provide a formally rigorous account of how property concepts—and ultimately scientific theories—can be constructed on the basis of similarity, particularly through a procedure he called quasi-analysis. Goodman famously challenged the viability of this method, later even claiming that the appeal to similarity is inherently problematic. This workshop aims to bring together scholars from both philosophical and psychological traditions to debate the role of similarity in constituting categorization, analogical reasoning, and belief systems—and to explore the continuing relevance of Carnap’s work in this debate. | |
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Reconstructing Rational Reconstruction: Quasi-Analysis vs. Explication in Carnapian Conceptual Engineering University of the Basque Country, Italy The contemporary debate on Carnapian conceptual engineering largely hinges on the late Carnap’s notion of explication. By contrast, the early Carnap’s notions of rational reconstruction and quasi-analysis have received comparatively little attention. Emphasis has been placed on the continuity (Dutilh-Novaes 2020) or discontinuity (Carus 2007) between rational reconstruction and explication. So far, the comparisons between rational reconstruction and explication have not taken into account the scientific revaluation of Carnap’s quasi-analysis, as developed by Mormann (2009) and Leitgeb (2007). In this contribution, I aim to bridge this gap by drawing a comparison between explication and rational reconstruction that takes into account the mathematical revaluation of Carnap’s quasi-analysis. I will argue for a thesis of discontinuity between rational reconstruction and explication. Specifically, I contend that (1) rational reconstruction and explication are distinct kinds of conceptual constructions. Moreover, I contend that (2) rational reconstruction exhibits philosophical virtues in responding to objections commonly raised against Carnapian conceptual engineering. To demonstrate (1) and (2), I assume that explication is equivalent to Carnap’s (1950) performances of explication. I also assume that rational reconstruction is equivalent to Carnap’s performance of quasi-analysis in the Aufbau (1928). | |