Conference Agenda
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W03.2: Similarity after Carnap - Perspectives from Philosophy and Cognitive Science Location: 23.21 U1.75 In his Aufbau programme, Carnap sought to provide a formally rigorous account of how property concepts—and ultimately scientific theories—can be constructed on the basis of similarity, particularly through a procedure he called quasi-analysis. Goodman famously challenged the viability of this method, later even claiming that the appeal to similarity is inherently problematic. This workshop aims to bring together scholars from both philosophical and psychological traditions to debate the role of similarity in constituting categorization, analogical reasoning, and belief systems—and to explore the continuing relevance of Carnap’s work in this debate. | |
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Similarity first Universität Greifswald, Germany Nelson Goodman formulated his general strictures against similarity as an explanatorily useful concept as a reaction to the usage of similarity as a fundament of cognitive development in empiricist philosophy and in Carnap’s Aufbau. His criticism influenced not only philosophers, but also cognitive scientists, who vividly debated on the role and nature of similarity since the 1970ies. One of the critical issues of the debate is the extent to which similarity itself is really fundamental or rather a result of reasoning, categorization and other cognitive processes. This talk aims to revisit the philosophical history of similarity as a foundational notion of explaining cognitive development. In this talk, I explore and cautiously defend the view that some variant of similarity should be considered as a fundamental notion, in line with Carnap’s original framework and the tradition of classical empiricism. | |