Conference Agenda
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W03.1: Similarity after Carnap - Perspectives from Philosophy and Cognitive Science Location: 23.21 U1.75 In his Aufbau programme, Carnap sought to provide a formally rigorous account of how property concepts—and ultimately scientific theories—can be constructed on the basis of similarity, particularly through a procedure he called quasi-analysis. Goodman famously challenged the viability of this method, later even claiming that the appeal to similarity is inherently problematic. This workshop aims to bring together scholars from both philosophical and psychological traditions to debate the role of similarity in constituting categorization, analogical reasoning, and belief systems—and to explore the continuing relevance of Carnap’s work in this debate. | |
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A representational generalization of Carnap’s quasi-analysis for Goodman’s interpretation of the AUFBAU as a theory of mapping scientific knowledge (online) independent, Japan According to Carnap’s AUFBAU, the concept of similarity occupies center stage in the logical constitution of the world. The basic method of constitution for Carnap was the method of quasi-analysis. Quasi-analysis crucially depends on the concept of similarity. According to Goodman, Carnap’s similarity-based method of constitution was fatally flawed. On the other hand, Goodman praised the AUFBAU as a philosophical work of first rank relevant for future philosophy of science. “The AUFBAU cannot yet be relegated to the status of a monument having purely historical interest. Its lessons have not been fully enough learned.” Goodman claimed: “The function of an AUFBAU constructional system is …to map experience. A map is schematic, selective, conventional and uniform. And these characteristics are virtues rather than defects.” In this talk I want to argue that a representational generalization of quasi-analysis renders plausible Goodman’s reading of the AUFBAU as a theory of mapping scientific knowledge. This mapping account may be an interesting project even for contemporary philosophy of science. | |