I will consider the characterization of scientific expert trespassing testimony (henceforth ‘trespassing testimony’) by taking a step back. In particular, I will consider what type of philosophical project it is to attempt a characterization of a phenomenon such as trespassing testimony. I will argue that this methodological discussion has important consequences for both the characterization of trespassing testimony and for the diagnosis of its ramifications. Indeed, I will exemplify this by considering some criticism of my 2018 characterization and by comparing it to Ballantyne’s 2019 characterization. I will also address some accounts that appear to presuppose that trespassing testimony is invariably epistemically and ethically bad. Finally, I will begin to consider philosophical trespassing testimony. It turns out that while it may be as problematic as scientific expert trespassing testimony, it is harder to characterize. Moreover, it is harder to specify the circumstances under which the epistemic and moral consequences of philosophical trespassing testimony are negative or positive.