In this talk, I argue that genuine progress in philosophy consists solely in the accumulation of philosophical knowledge among relevant philosophers. This growth has both veritistic and epistemic dimensions. On the veritistic side, progress involves acquiring more true beliefs, organizing them in increasingly systematic and compressed formats, and ensuring they capture more and more levels of reality. Over time, such growth requires the production of general, positive, and explanatory beliefs.

On the epistemic side, what matters is not merely having true beliefs but acquiring knowledge—true beliefs held in ways that reliably exclude error. Otherwise, the pursuit of truth might tolerate a significant number of falsehoods. But this is obviously not compatible with our understanding of progress. Crucially, collective philosophical progress does not depend on all—or even most—philosophers expanding their knowledge. What matters is that relevant philosophers—those at the forefront of inquiry—do so.

I defend this account of philosophical progress against prominent alternatives, including views that disconnect progress from truth, equate it with improved understanding, or define it in terms of problem-solving.

In the second part of the talk, I address several major challenges to the idea of philosophical progress, including the prevalence of negative knowledge, persistent peer disagreement, and the lack of widely accepted evidence in the field. I argue that these challenges can be met if we adopt and consistently apply the account of progress I propose.