Does reflective equilibrium (RE) provide an appropriate and illuminating account of moral understanding? The answer depends on what we wish to capture with an explication of moral understanding and how we interpret RE. In this talk, I argue that a straightforward and unambiguous account of RE can be used to explicate moral understanding. It is true that merely holding a RE does not suffice for understanding, and articulating an RE-account of moral understanding requires some caution. Still, these challenges can be met. The problem, though, is that the resulting notion of moral understanding is fairly narrow, focusing on normative explanations of why certain moral judgments hold. There are arguably additional abilities or achievements we might want to cover with a notion of moral understanding, e.g., sensitivity to a broad range of moral concerns, understanding of alternative ethical viewpoints, or the ability to transform moral insight into action. I discuss how we may integrate these things into a richer RE-based account of moral understanding without moving too far away from RE or diluting its core idea. In any case, I suggest, going through the process of RE makes a central contribution to deepening our moral understanding.