There are few texts addressing the issue of the distinction between true philosophy and ‘false’, ‘bogus’ or ‘pseudo-philosophy’. All the approaches so far share a similar structure – pseudo-philosophy is defined in terms of certain relation to the standards of true philosophy. The difference between these approaches lies only in the different definition of this relationship. This shared structure of the previous theories of pseudo-philosophy results in an impasse. Firstly, it entangles the issue in the problem of uninformativeness, since there is no agreement on the content of the ‘standards of true philosophy’. Secondly, it fails to grasp the difference between pseudo-philosophy and ‘bad’ philosophy, i.e. low-quality deliberation. In my talk, I will review previous approaches and describe the problems mentioned above. I will then present my own attempt to overcome the impasse in considering pseudo-philosophy. I shall call it ‘social metaphilosophy’, i.e. an approach to the discipline that shifts the focus from philosophical rules, values and essential properties to the socio-institutional aspects of philosophizing. I will attempt to argue that social metaphilosophy elucidates the notion of pseudo-philosophy better than the traditional ‘individual’ approach.