Traditionally, deliberation - linked to terms like ‘controlled’, ‘reflective’, or ‘conscious’ - is seen as uniquely human, and cashed in terms of abstract, intellectual processes (Kahneman, 2012; Broome, 2013). Nonhuman animals are denied such capacities: their minds are commonly considered as limited to unconscious, automatic processing. While Buckner’s (2019) deflationary account of deliberation, which involves minimal executive and cognitive control challenges this intellectualist view, and renders minimal deliberation attributable to nonhuman animals (e.g., uncertainty monitoring or inhibition), I take a step further and argue for ‘beyond minimal’ deliberation in nonhuman animals. I analyze the evidence from Osvath & Osvath’s (2008) study: apes chose between an immediate small reward and a tool enabling future access to a larger reward that is not perceptually available nor cued. Since the decision-making process involves comparing the decoupled value of the absent reward against the immediately tempting smaller reward, I argue that the apes' choice in this study suggests a capacity for deliberation that goes beyond the minimal executive control and actually involves reflection or metacognition. In this proposal, I also reconceptualize the metacognitive process involved - as affective metacognition, which involves evaluating values of different options through felt preferences.