This talks pursues a meta-epistemological approach to the classic internalism vs. externalism debate about epistemic rationality. Dogramaci (2012) advocates for the view that ascriptions of rationality serve what I call the policing purpose, that is ascriptions of epistemic rationality have the function of encouraging others to follow correct belief-forming rules. I argue that accepting this policing purpose supports a modest kind of externalism. This modest externalism respects intuitions regarding the new evil demon case and differs from established externalist theories like reliabilism or knowledge-first epistemology. The main idea is that the fittingness of S being policed by others is not solely a matter of S’s actual psychology. Therefore, as internalism suggests a strong link between epistemic rationality and S’s psychology, that is S’s (accessible) mental states, the metaepistemological approach that links epistemic rationality to epistemic policing does not favour internalism, but externalism.