There is moral luck, but its impact varies depending on the agent’s mindset. While a would-be killer who aims and shoots is equally blameworthy regardless of whether she hits her target, a driver who texts behind the wheel deserves different degrees of blame depending on whether she actually harms someone. By choosing to text behind the wheel, a driver exposes herself to the risk of ending up more blameworthy if she happens to harm someone. If this risk does not materialize, the driver, who neither intended nor caused any harm, is morally lucky, i.e. deserving of less blame than she would be had she hit a pedestrian. This, however, doesn’t apply to the would-be killer who misses her target. She is unlucky in the everyday sense (because she misses her victim contrary to her intention). Fate interfering with one’s own plans cannot benefit one’s moral responsibility in the same way as when fate goes along with one’s own plans. My argument suggests that moral luck’s impact operates along a continuum, with its influence diminishing as the quality of will worsens. This new perspective on moral luck better aligns with both our considered judgments and legal practice.