This paper critically examines Miranda Fricker's virtue-ethical approach to addressing testimonial injustice, acknowledging its limitations and proposing a novel perspective. We analyze two main criticisms of Fricker's account: the impracticality of acquiring individual virtues due to implicit biases and meta-blindness, and the need for collective responses to address socially rooted epistemic injustices. While recognizing these critiques, we argue that individual efforts can still significantly impact unjust credibility deficits in certain contexts. To this end, we introduce the concept of "speaker virtues" to complement Fricker's focus on hearer virtues, and argue, that this extended framework can empower victims and restores their agency as knowers. Drawing on recognition theory, we demonstrate how victims' engagement in a "struggle for recognition of credibility" can resolve specific instances of epistemic injustice and contribute to broader social change. The paper addresses potential objections, particularly concerns about placing burdens on victims, and concludes by highlighting the advantages of this integrated approach in providing practical strategies for addressing epistemic injustice in various contexts.