In my talk, I will discuss the recently presented claim by Tilton and Toole that dominant knowers can and should hold marginalized standpoints. While their arguments are mostly convincing, I will show that some problems arise with this view that have not been discussed in standpoint epistemology. For instance, standpoint epistemologists have conceived the method for achieving a standpoint (consciousness-raising) as exclusionary to dominant knowers. I will argue that we should understand consciousness-raising as a process of epistemic cooperation. Then, I will provide some epistemic norms for such cooperation between marginalized and dominant knowers for the latter to achieve standpoints. To do so, I will also discuss a joint paper by Tilton and Toole in which they respond to Taiwo’s critique on deference. Contrary to them, I will argue that for dominant knowers to achieve standpoints, they must defer to epistemically superior marginalized knowers to access relevant evidence and epistemic virtues and behaviours. I will conclude with some words of caution for dominant knowers on how not to dominate marginalized knowers but help to further (epistemic) justice for them.