Phenomenal structuralism claims that each phenomenal character is fully individuated in terms of its relations to other phenomenal characters. This conflicts with the widely held view that phenomenal character is an intrinsic affair, i.e., that what it is like to undergo a particular experience is solely a matter of that experience’s intrinsic properties. Rather than offering another direct argument for phenomenal structuralism, the aim of this talk is to develop an error theory about intrinsicalism that explains how we come to believe that phenomenal character is intrinsic, why we hold onto this belief, and why it is nevertheless mistaken.

To this end, I will appeal to several considerations and point out how they account for the persistence of intrinsicalist intuitions: First, introspection and memory suggest that experiences are independent and self-contained, fostering the impression that what it is like to undergo a particular experience is wholly independent of other experiences. Second, it is cognitively more efficient to treat phenomenal properties as non-relational properties. Third, linguistic behavior further reinforces the impression that phenomenal character is intrinsic. The upshot is that phenomenal intrinsicalism is much less plausible than it is commonly taken to be, thereby making room for phenomenal structuralism.