Conference Agenda
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Daily Overview |
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S53: Metaethics, Rationality & Decision Theory 4 Location: 23.03 01.24 Session Chair: Dmitry Ananiev | |
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3:00pm - 3:45pm
Prudential Companions in Guilt? Heidelberg University, Germany According to the prudential companions in guilt argument (Fletcher 2018; 2021, Ch. 6): 1. If arguments for the moral error theory succeed, then analogues of these arguments establish the prudential error theory. (The parity premise.) 2. The prudential error theory is false; some prudential judgements attributing properties like being good (better) or bad (worse) for x are true. (The prudential existence premise.) Therefore, 3. Arguments for the moral error theory fail. My focus in this talk is on evaluating the parity premise, specifically with respect to what is probably the most influential argument for moral error theory in contemporary analytic philosophy, the argument from reasons. According to the argument from reasons, moral facts entail that a certain type of normative reason exists, but there are no such reasons. I contend that the parity premise succeeds with respect to some but not all the ways in which the argument from reasons has been developed in the literature. | |