Consider the following case:

Mistaken Identity. Alex aims a firearm at a silhouette which he mistakenly takes to be Bernard’s. Only after pulling the trigger does Alex realise that he in fact shot Chris.

There is unanimous agreement across both common law and civil law jurisdictions that Alex is to be held liable for the intentional killing of Chris. After all, the argument goes, Alex intended to shoot the person in front of him and succeeded in doing so. And although the identity of the victim may bear on Alex’s motive, it is entirely irrelevant to his intention.

In my paper, I argue that the legal orthodoxy is action-theoretically misguided. The above claim would hold true only if Alex intended to shoot the person in front of him as a particular. But, as I argue, we rarely intend particulars; most frequently, we intend under a description. And once we understand Alex to have intended to {kill the person in front of him}, both a de dicto and de re reading become available, each of which has different implications for the precise scope of his intention. I spell out these implications and assess their upshots for the question of Alex’s liability.